What Can Be Done in Iraq?

I'm not sure what it was about August 2005 but two wise observers of our Iraq policy made suggestions then that are worth looking at again today. On August 21, 2005, current professor and former military man Andrew Bacevich spoke out in a Washington Post Op-Ed, "Call It a Day".

Among other things Bacevich wrote:

Rather than producing liberal democracy, our meddling in Iraqi politics has exacerbated political dysfunction. And by signaling the importance that it attributes to satisfying the core interests of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds alike, Washington has encouraged all three factions to increase their demands. Convinced that the Americans will never permit a cataclysmic collision, each faction is committed to playing a high-stakes game of chicken. If Iraq in August 2005 qualifies as the political equivalent of a clapped-out, self-abusing dependent, then the Bush administration ought to be recognized as being an enabler.... Stability -- defined as preserving a unified Iraq and reducing the insurgency -- cannot be imposed. It can only be negotiated by the various factions constituting the Iraqi polity. The issues dividing those factions are by no means trivial. But their common interest in maintaining the integrity of the state is also great. Announcing the U.S. departure will concentrate the minds of Iraqi leaders of all stripes. It will clear away any misconceptions regarding the consequences of secession.In addition to assuming that Iraqis require American supervision, the Bush administration's insistence on staying the course also implicitly assumes that a U.S. withdrawal would leave a dangerous political vacuum in the region. But this assumption too is suspect. More likely, the American departure would foster a political dynamic in which Iraq's neighbors would exert themselves to keep Iraq from spinning out of control -- not out of any concern for the well-being of the Iraqi peoplebut out of sheer self-interest.

On August 22 Juan Cole, current professor and former military brat, offered a 10 point plan for disengaging from Iraq. Today on his blog Professor Cole has dusted off this plan and suggested comparing it to the Iraq Study Group's recommendations 17 months later. Cole wrote today:

Alas, I no longer think that the US military can plausibly play the role I suggested for it below, and I had no idea of how vicious the civil war could get with nighttime death squads. They don't need set piece battles to kill 60 a day in the streets of Baghdad. But, it seems to me that these suggestions track pretty well with those of the Baker-Hamilton commission.

Juan Cole on What Maliki Wants from Bush

Today Juan Cole helps us understand some of the details often left out of criticism of al Maliki's performance: "Al-Maliki has been pressing Washington for some time to give him the authority to order much bigger battle units into action without securing permission first from the US military. The PM has been frustrated that he isn't allowed to set security policy but then is blamed for not achieving security." Hmmmm. That's typical of nearly all our performance in Iraq: we jealously guard the power but criticize them if things go wrong; and scapegoating the Iraqis has recently become the US power elite's favorite tune.

Tilting in Iraq, Part 2

Laura Rozen pointed out this from the Washington Post as evidence for her view that the Bush administration may tilt toward the Sunnis:

But in a sign of the discord in Washington, the senior U.S. intelligence official said the situation requires that the administration abandon its long-held goal of national reconciliation and instead "pick a winner" in Iraq. He said he understands that means the Sunnis are likely to bolt from the fragile government. "That's the price you're going to have to pay," he said.

This "senior U.S. intelligence official" was not identified in the article and note that the article says his comments were "a sign of the discord in Washington". Thus we still don't know what the administration is going to do and who, if anyone, they are going to tilt toward.

But here's a scenario stressing accomodating the Sunnis, under the title "Will Bush Rehabilitate the Baathists?" Juan Cole reports from Arabic newspaper Al-Zaman but doesn't say whether Al-Zaman tends to be biased toward Sunnis or not.

Flailing of the Bushies

Juan Cole observed that the Bush administration is panicked and hasn't much idea what to do in Iraq and thus is flailing around. Something like this does seem to be true.

This process sounds so muddled because Washington is flailing around without the slightest idea of what could be done, practically speaking, in Iraq, according to Time: "Several officials who are in touch with commission members said that with violence appearing to spiral out of control in Iraq, the group has been flummoxed about finding a solution. "There's complete bewilderment as to what to do," one official said. "They're very frustrated. They can't come up with anything. For the last couple months, they've been thrashing around, calling people, trying to find ideas."

I think this flailing around for a solution after the elections has also activated the various groups in Iraq to jockey more aggressively for power.

More Signs of Change in Iraq

I don't believe in saying I understand something better than I do so at this point I can share that it seems as though there are increasing signs of jockeying for power and possible realignment of alliances going on in Iraq, however, I don't know how to accurately judge the significance of these signs or predict the outcome. If one looks at recent posts of Juan Cole and Laura Rozen you may see what I mean. Cole reports:

Harith al-Dhari, Secretary-General of the Association of Muslim Scholars said in Cairo that the Arab League and the United Nations should withdraw their support from the Shiite-dominated government of PM Nuri al-Maliki.

This sounds like non-Iraqi Sunnis trying to weaken support for the Shia-dominated al Maliki government. Cole also reports:

Iraqi Speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani recommended entrusting peshmargas with guarding members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Al-Mashhadani made his recommendation during the council's in camera session that discussed the members' safety, today 23 November 06. Al-Mashhadani's proposal comes following an unsuccessful assassination attempt against him in which his convoy was targeted by explosive devises.

For a long time the Kurdish militia, the Peshmerga, has wanted to be allowed by the Americans to be more involved in defeating the insurgency and increasing the power of the Kurds. Presumably the Americans wanted to do it without calling on militias representing only sub-groups within Iraq. This report makes it sound like the Kurdish Peshmerga may be called upon now to become more involved.

Moreover, Laura Rozen noted a newspaper report:

Followers of the militant Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr took over state-run television Saturday to denounce the Iraqi government, label Sunnis 'terrorists' and issue what appeared to many viewers as a call to arms. [...] Al-Maliki's administration acknowledged it was powerless to interrupt the pro-Sadr program on the official Iraqiya channel, during which Sadr City residents shouted, 'There is no government! There is no state!' Several speakers described neighborhoods and well-known Sunni politicians as 'terrorists' and threatened them with reprisal.

This sounds like further disintegration of the Iraqi central government's power and Sadrists, who have until recently been within the al Maliki coalition now calling for al Maliki's fall. As I said, what I sense in this is increased jockeying for power, possible disintegration of the central government's support, and the possibility of new power alignments within Iraq and among the surrounding states. This seems to have been accelerated by the American elections which makes it look to all as though potential changes in American policy might be imminent; thus Iraqi and regional groups are trying to get themselves in the strongest possible position.

If You Didn't Think Iraq Could Get Worse, Look Again

It's hard to imagine how anyone could read Juan Cole's posts on Iraq in the last couple of days and not think that a situation that was already horrible has suddenly worsened. I'm not sure why this is but the sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunnis appears to have escalated. I suppose that it's possible that the American elections have alerted everyone that U.S. participation in Iraq might soon change and motivated all groups to make desperate efforts to strengthen their power positions in case any important decisions are made soon. The Washington Post is also commenting upon this deterioration; however, if you read this WAPO article be sure to read further down below all the usual verbal nonsense uttered by the administration.

A Last Desperate Gambit to 'Save' Iraq War?

Yesterday Laura Rozen wrote in the LA Times that the Bush administration was considering a tilt toward the Iraqi Shiites. Today the same newspaper reports that the Shiite-dominated al Maliki government has issued a warrant for the arrest of a popular and prominent Sunni cleric, Shaikh Harith al-Dhari, the leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars. Juan Cole today wrote: “This arrest warrant, coming after the attack by Interior Ministry Special Police Commandos on the Sunni-led Ministry of Higher Education and recent kidnappings by the Sunni Arab guerrilla groups of Shiites-- all this activity points to a war among Iraq's major parties, many of whom have parts of the government under their control.”

Let us speculate by connecting some dots: 1) the election has placed great pressure on the administration to change its Iraqi policy; 2) Bush is very stubborn and may make a last stab at ‘saving’ his Iraq war policy; 3) Laura Rozen reported: “This past Veterans Day weekend, according to my sources, almost the entire Bush national security team gathered for an unpublicized two-day meeting. The topic: Iraq. The purpose of the meeting was to come up with a consensus position on a new path forward”; 4) today the al Maliki government issues an arrest warrant for a prominent Sunni opponent.

Virtually all of the Bush administration’s policies in the Middle East have been extremely risky and ill-advised. Laura Rozen wrote: “A U.S. tilt toward the Shiites is a risky strategy, one that could further alienate Iraq's Sunni neighbors and that could backfire by driving its Sunni population into common cause with foreign jihadists and Al Qaeda cells.” Recall that al Qaeda is a Sunni group. Although Bush’s favored ‘reason’ we can’t withdraw is that there would be “chaos” and “civil war” if we left, siding with the Shiites against the Sunnis would be likely to further enflame civil and sectarian war. We must never be surprised by such apparent contradictions. Most of the public pronouncements of the Bush administration are propaganda aimed to emotionally manipulate public opinion, not sincere revelations of their true motives. (Recall that Karl Rove's favorite book is Machiavelli's "The Prince".) What they say about their ‘reasons’ almost never accurately reflects their true thinking. That’s why Bush could say he was keeping Rumsfeld a couple of days before the election and fire him the day after. He blithely assumes that public statements can be false if he deems it necessary to influence the public.

I believe this again underlines why we must end our occupation of Iraq and only do those things we are called upon to do by the Iraqi authorities. (See my How to Get Out of Iraq.) We must stop trying to influence their affairs and only function as a helpful resource. If we engage in risky strategies to influence Iraq then we put ourselves in position to be blamed for any bad outcome and put ourselves at further risk of blowback.

General Abizaid's Testimony

While scrounging around trying to find a transcript of Abizaid's testimony I find Juan Cole has already made the primary point I wanted to make:

Here's how I interpret the contretemps Wednesday between Gen. John Abizaid and Republican Senator John McCain.. McCain wants to send another division, about 20,000 US troops, to Iraq. Abizaid told him: 1) that would produce only a temporary improvement since the US doesn't have a spare division to send to Iraq for the long term and 2) Increased US troop levels are counterproductive because they remove the incentive for the Iraqi government and army to get their acts together and fight the guerrillas and militias effectively and 3) If Iraq is going to come back to better days, it will have to be primarily with Iraqi troops and 4) Iraqi troops are not now doing the job, so if more US troops are sent to Iraq it should be as trainers and units available for joint patrols, not as independent combat troops. I'd just like to point out that most of Abizaid's arguments could also be deployed for a phased withdrawal, which he opposed. My senator, Carl Levin supports the phased withdrawal idea, and so do I. What if it isn't just an increased US presence that would remove the incentive for Iraqi leaders to compromise and/or fight effectively? What if *present* troop levels do that? I say, let's take out a division ASAP (20,000 men) and make it clear that we're never putting a division back in to replace it. Then let the Iraqis try to fill the resulting vacuum themselves. Give them armored vehicles, tanks, helicopter gunships, and a nice wood-panelled room where they can negotiate with one another. And then after a couple of months I would pull out another US division. Such a phased withdrawal is not guaranteed to succeed. It has a better chance of succeeding than the current policy.

This is very important: the arguments Cole cites Abizaid as making support a phased withdrawal. 1) Abizaid says we haven't got the extra troops and they would only be a temporary aid. 2) Abizaid says more troops would remove Iraqi incentive to do it themselves. If this principle is accepted then why doesn't it increase Iraqi incentive to begin a phased withdrawal?? Obviously we must be concerned about maximizing Iraqi incentive to protect themselves, make compromises with one another, disarm militias, etc. Beginning a phased withdrawal or at least serious negotiations to begin such a withdrawal increases such incentive. 3) Ditto re Iraqi troops too. 4) If we can increase U.S. trainers without them being in combat then this may be a good idea.

My impression is that these "Hearings" are pretty sterile affairs because Congresspeople don't ask very tough questions or follow up on important issues. Abazaid said the next 4-6 months are crucial. Will anyone hold him to this or will he be back in six months again saying 'Trust me,success is just around the corner'? (This is 'deja vu all over again' if you're old enough to remember Vietnam.) Abizaid said a withdrawal timetable would limit the military leadership's flexibility (and this was the headline for a million news accounts so it got immense publicity). Did anyone ask "flexibility to do what?" "How would it limit your flexibility?" "What benchmarks of progress can we look at in six months to see if your 'flexibility' led to desired results?" Instead of just accepting these platitudes is anyone asking any tough questions?

How to Get Out of Iraq

I have tried to select some key components from suggestions for how to get out of Iraq. I take these ideas primarily from Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, and Juan Cole, Professor of Middle East History at University of Michigan and originator of the very popular blog, Informed Comment. (The primary source for Brzezinski's ideas are Iraq: Next Steps for U.S. Policy). With the recent election of Democratic majorities in Congress and the report of the Iraq Study Group next month, it is crucial that we begin to think carefully about how we get out of Iraq now. It is especially important because the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group may be so focused upon some kind of "compromise" position that they end up providing cover for continuation of the war. You know what they say: A camel is a horse designed by a committee. If you're my age you recall how many times we were told the Vietnam War was about to end. I begin with some "psychology" that I see as the prime underpinning for a disengagement strategy.

The major key to U.S. withdrawal is using some “psychology” to which the Bush 43 administration has seemed singularly closed. This administration thrives on being “tough”, and military and forcing opponents to “knuckle under”. This strategy of coercion has been a notable failure. As in Judo, one doesn’t try to force one’s opponent; one uses the opponent's forcefulness to defeat him. The U.S. needs to stop trying to force the Iraqis to do things our way and arrange to withdraw our troops thereby encouraging Iraqi initiative to develop. We say: “Call us slow, but we’ve come to the realization that we are seen as an occupying force and are thus adding to your problems. We have therefore decided to withdraw our combat troops. Let’s start talking about when and how we should leave and whether, at your request, we can be of any further help. We stand ready to help, but only in those ways that you Iraqis want us to help.” Note that in one fell swoop we have dropped our role as dreaded “occupier” and become simply an available resource if we are called upon for help.

Doesn’t this more fully accord with Republican Party belief that only those who pull themselves up by their own bootstraps are likely to succeed? Don’t local people know what is best for themselves? Don’t we want to get Big Brother and his $1.4 Billion a week dole out of there and stop sapping Iraqi initiative? We should ONLY be doing in Iraq those things that Iraqi’s representatives have asked us to do.

NEGOTIATE U.S. DEPARTURE. Brzezinski: I favor a decision by the United States to leave Iraq. And the way I would go about it would be that I would ask the Iraqi leaders to ask us to leave. I would not announce it arbitrarily, but I would talk to the Iraqi leaders about our decision, our inclination, and I would encourage them to ask us to leave. The assumption of responsibility by Iraqi leaders who know that they are now going to be responsible for the future of the country is more likely to produce leaders that are prepared to lead and have the capacity to lead. Some U.S. forces might garrison in Kurdish area and Kuwait and might return to help police if requested by Iraqi government.

Informed Comment 11/13/06: Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki… pressed his plan to have US troops withdraw to garrisons to be called on only in emergencies. He wants to deploy Iraqi troops more actively instead.”

Brzezinski: In addition, it is likely that both Kuwait and the Kurdish regions of Iraq would be amenable to some residual U.S. military presence as a guarantee against a sudden upheaval.

SET DEPARTURE DATE. Brzezinski: I think we should set a date for the termination of the occupation…. But I would think that within a year we should be able to complete an orderly disengagement and the process would be extremely useful in concentrating Iraqi minds on what will follow and encourage them to assume responsibility.

I do not believe for a minute the argument that setting a date somehow or other would help the insurgency, that somehow or other the insurgents would go into their hiding caves or wherever and wait until the moment we leave and then suddenly they will surface and pounce. It’s not the kind of an insurgency. It’s an insurgency that is much more dispersed, spontaneous, in the crevices of Iraqi society expressing itself, also sometimes on the basis of monetary opportunity.

EMPOWER IRAQI GROUPS TO CRAFT A COMPROMISE. Brzezinski: How certain are we in the judgment that if we were to desist, the Shiites and the Kurds would not be capable of compelling an arrangement with the Sunnis. The Shiites and the Kurds together account for about 75 percent of the population and they have an overwhelming advantage. The Shiites then would be faced with a difficult decision and the Sunnis then would be faced with a difficult decision: whether to accommodate or to resist, to challenge. And I think a reasonable judgment is they will probably be divided. Some will choose the path of accommodation and we know even some Sunni leaders who advocate that. And some will choose the path of resistance. But the outcome, I think, of such a confrontation is also predictable: namely, that the Kurds and the Shiites will prevail. Is that an outcome necessarily worse than staying on course if one makes the judgment that staying on course involves a more and more difficult war of attrition, not to speak of its international consequences, but focusing purely on the Iraqi context?

In an Iraq dominated by the Shiites and the Kurds -- who together account for close to 75 percent of the population -- the two peoples would share a common interest in Iraq's independence as a state. The Kurds, with their autonomy already amounting in effect to quasi-sovereignty, would otherwise be threatened by the Turks. And the Iraqi Shiites are first of all Arabs; they have no desire to be Iran's satellites. Some Sunnis, once they were aware that the U.S. occupation was drawing to a close and that soon they would be facing an overwhelming Shiite-Kurdish coalition, would be more inclined to accommodate the new political realities, especially when deprived of the rallying cry of resistance to a foreign occupier.

EMPOWER IRAQIS TO CALL A REGIONAL CONFERENCE. Brzezinski: I would also encourage the Iraqi government – not have the U.S. do it – to call for a regional conference. I would have the Iraqi government call for a regional conference of Muslim states, some immediately adjoining Iraq, others more distant. By way of example, one might mention Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, perhaps also Turkey (although that is sensitive because of Kurdistan), Algeria, Tunisia, and maybe even Iran. If the Iraqis wished it a post-US multinational force might be organized; onethat might hope to keep ethnic and religious militias from marching against one another in the thousands and killing milions. The UN might be involved if the Iraqi government wished.

Cole 04/05/06: “The six neighbors have the highest stakes in Iraq-- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran. They should immediately be called to a 6 + 3 meeting with the United States, Britain and the Arab League to begin the work of constituting a post-US multinational force that might hope to keep ethnic and religious militias from marching against one another in the thousands and killing millions.”

From the San Jose Mercury News of 11/13/06 demonstrating the motivation of regional powers to help end violence in Iraq:

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia - Saudi Arabia's interior minister on Sunday called Iraq a major base for terrorism, a sign of growing alarm over the neighboring country where U.S. forces are struggling to prevent Sunni-Shiite violence from escalating into full-scale civil war. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif said the situation in Iraq is deteriorating daily and the country has become a threat to the whole region. "There is no doubt that Iraq now forms a main base for terrorism," he told the pan-Arab Al-Arabiya television station in the capital Riyadh. "The situation in Iraq is changing day after day, and this situation has numerous threats," he said before his departure to the United Arab Emirates to attend a meeting on security issues in the Gulf states. The minister also said Saudi youth were being lured to fight in Iraq. U.S. and Iraqi officials have long complained about Saudi extremists crossing into Iraq to join the battle against American and coalition forces. U.S. officials announced last April that Saudis were one of the top five nationalities among foreign fighters captured by coalition forces in Iraq. The oil-rich kingdom has been moving forward with plans to build a fence along its frontier with Iraq to prevent militants from crossing the border.


Cole 04/05/06:” We need a UN command in Iraq, and need a multinational force (probably in the main Arab League) that can go on helping the Iraqis maintain a minimum of social peace after the US is out.”

Brzezinski: Once the United States terminated its military occupation, some form of participation by Muslim states in peacekeeping in Iraq would be easier to contrive, and their involvement could also help to cool anti-American passions in the region.

Brzezinski: I noted in the news today the Iranian willingness to talk to us about more stability in Iraq, to deal with the issue of post-disengagement stabilization, something which is in their own interest, and so therefore it is not a plea, a desperate plea for help. It is not a plea to replace one occupier with another set of occupiers, but it is to ask them to be engaged with the Iraqis on an Iraqi initiative regarding stabilization after the United States has left.
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I would be pleased to hear from others any criticisms of these ideas or any additional ideas to help us get out of Iraq.