In The Dawn of the Pseudo-Conservatives I quoted Sidney Blumenthal: "Robert Taft, the old standard-bearer of the Republican right, had always referred to himself as a 'liberal.'" Realizing this may sound odd, let me clarify. Several individuals of the right considered themselves "classical liberals". Robert Taft was one and Milton Friedman was another. Friedman who was identified as a conservative economist really considered himself a “liberal” (Capitalism and Freedom, 2002, p. 5-6): "It is extremely convenient to have a label for the political and economic viewpoint elaborated in this book. The rightful and proper label is liberalism… [which] emphasized freedom as the ultimate goal and the individual as the ultimate entity in the society. It supported laissez faire at home as a means of reducing the role of the state in economic affairs… [and] free trade abroad…. In political matters, it supported the development of representative government and of parliamentary institutions, reduction in the arbitrary power of the state, and protection of the civil freedoms of individuals."
Friedman (p. 6) rejected the term "conservative": "Because of the corruption of the term liberalism, the views that formerly went under that name are now often labeled conservatism. But this is not a satisfactory alternative.... We do not wish to conserve state interventions that have interfered so greatly with our freedom.... [I]n practice, the term conservatism has come to cover so wide a range of views, and views so incompatible with one another, that we shall no doubt see the growth of hyphenated designations, such as libertarian-conservative and aristocratic-conservative."
And what was "the corruption of the term liberalism" to which Friedman referred? "Beginning in the late nineteenth century, and especially after 1930 in the United States, the term liberalism came to be associated with a very different emphasis.... It came to be associated with a readiness to rely primarily on the state rather than on private voluntary arrangements to achieve objectives regarded as desirable. The catchwords became welfare and equality rather than freedom."
My goodness gracious me; what, oh what, could have befallen these classical liberal defenders of freedom? What could have motivated their betrayal of classical liberal principles? Hmmmm. Dr. Friedman suggested that this falling away from first principles had its "beginning in the late nineteenth century." Hmmmm. I wonder if it might have had anything at all to do with the massive and unprecedented growth in power of huge trusts and corporations resulting from what has aptly been referred to as the American Industrial "Revolution"? Classical liberal laissez faire was a great philosophy in the America of 1825; an America where farms and small businesses were predominant. But slowly after 1825 there arose the railroads, the Rockefeller oil empire, the sugar trust, the steel trust, the copper trust, etc. etc. etc. By the late nineteenth century the American economy had been revolutionized and Robber Barons and their ilk possessed unprecedented economic and political power.
What institution of late nineteenth century America might have any chance at all of regulating and moderating the abuses of these new "malefactors of great wealth" (T. Roosevelt)? Obviously only one institution could have served this function, the government, and primarily the national government. That is why defenders of "freedom" turned to that national government to remedy the gross imbalance of power brought about by the industrial revolution. And again, during the Great Depression and after, Franklin Delano Roosevelt also used the federal government to ensure that not just the powerful, wealthy and privileged were able to endure and prosper. Here is what FDR had to say to the 1936 Democratic National Convention:
"For out of this modern civilization economic royalists carved new dynasties. New kingdoms were built upon concentration of control over material things. Through new uses of corporations, banks and securities, new machinery of industry and agriculture, of labor and capital-all undreamed of by the fathers-the whole structure of modern life was impressed into this royal service."
"There was no place among this royalty for our many thousands of small business men and merchants who sought to make a worthy use of the American system of initiative and profit. They were no more free than the worker or the farmer. Even honest and progressive-minded men of wealth, aware of their obligation to their generation, could never know just where they fitted into this dynastic scheme of things."
"It was natural and perhaps human that the privileged princes of these new economic dynasties, thirsting for power, reached out for control over Government itself. They created a new despotism and wrapped it in the robes of legal sanction. In its service new mercenaries sought to regiment the people, their labor, and their property. And as a result the average man once more confronts the problem that faced the Minute Man."
"The hours men and women worked, the wages they received, the conditions of their labor-these had passed beyond the control of the people, and were imposed by this new industrial dictatorship. The savings of the average family, the capital of the small business man, the investments set aside for old age-other people's money-these were tools which the new economic royalty used to dig itself in."
"Those who tilled the soil no longer reaped the rewards which were their right. The small measure of their gains was decreed by men in distant cities."
"Throughout the Nation, opportunity was limited by monopoly. Individual initiative was crushed in the cogs of a great machine. The field open for free business was more and more restricted. Private enterprise, indeed, became too private. It became privileged enterprise, not free enterprise."
"An old English judge once said: "Necessitous men are not free men." Liberty requires opportunity to make a living-a living decent according to the standard of the time, a living which gives man not only enough to live by, but something to live for."
"For too many of us the political equality we once had won was meaningless in the face of economic inequality. A small group had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over other people's property, other people's money, other people's labor-other people's lives. For too many of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer real; men could no longer follow the pursuit of happiness."
"Against economic tyranny such as this, the American citizen could appeal only to the organized power of Government. The collapse of 1929 showed up the despotism for what it was. The election of 1932 was the people's mandate to end it. Under that mandate it is being ended."
"The royalists of the economic order have conceded that political freedom was the business of the Government, but they have maintained that economic slavery was nobody's business. They granted that the Government could protect the citizen in his right to vote, but they denied that the Government could do anything to protect the citizen in his right to work and his right to live."
"Today we stand committed to the proposition that freedom is no half-and-half affair. If the average citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling place, he must have equal opportunity in the market place."
"These economic royalists complain that we seek to overthrow the institutions of America. What they really complain of is that we seek to take away their power. Our allegiance to American institutions requires the overthrow of this kind of power. In vain they seek to hide behind the Flag and the Constitution. In their blindness they forget what the Flag and the Constitution stand for. Now, as always, they stand for democracy, not tyranny; for freedom, not subjection; and against a dictatorship by mob rule and the over-privileged alike."
That was FDR's answer to the likes of Milton Friedman. That is why the "modern liberal" turned to government in the name of liberty. And preferential treatment for the privileged is no less the aim of pseudo-conservatives today than it was in 1900 or in 1930. They are just much more cunning and clever in their use of the modern means of politics and mass media than they ever were before.
Saturday, October 14, 2006
Dawn of the Pseudo-Conservatives, Part 2
In my preceding post I made a point I think is important and want to elaborate upon:
"This is only one example of the glaring contradictions at the heart of pseudo-conservative ideology; while they constantly make a public fuss about their opposition to "Big Government" and demand that Republicans "starve the beast", they merrily and aggressively support virtually every increase in the defense budget ever introduced. Pseudo-conservatives have never met a defense increase they didn't like. And yet it seems likely that the largest increases in the federal government are contributed in expansions for "defense" and "national security"."
It is not just likely but virtually certain that it is precisely the expansion of government for war, "defense" and "national security" that most inflates our central government and yet it is precisely these expansions that pseudo-conservatives religiously support. For an example look at Eric Foner's Reconstruction p.23: "The federal budget, amounting to $63 million in 1860, rose to well over $1 billion by 1865. At war's end the federal bureaucracy, with 53,000 employees including Custom House officials, internal revenue agents, clerks, and inspectors, was the largest employer in the nation. And the generous system of pensions for Union veterans... inaugurated in 1865 (and amounting by the turn of the century to one third of the government's entire budget) created both a vast new patronage machine for the Republican party and a broad constituency commited to maintaining the integrity of the national state...."
Don't fool yourself by thinking that because this was a war, and not merely peacetime "defense" spending, that my point is not supported. It is certainly wars that most expand the federal government, but peacetime spending for "defense" and "national security" also hugely expand the central government. Moreover, with pseudo-conservatives like George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and Elliott Abrams in office you can count on more wars as well as huge peacetime "defense" spending.
It is quite notable that pseudo-conservative Buckley vowed to "read Dwight Eisenhower out of the conservative movement." Very revealing when you consider that Eisenhower really was conservative as well as significantly worried about the military-industrial complex.
James Madison, the "father" of our revered Constitution wrote:
"The means of defense against foreign danger historically have become the instruments of tyranny at home."
"It is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to the provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."
"Of all the enemies of public liberty, war is perhaps the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other."
"No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare."
"The truth is that all men having power ought to be mistrusted."
So folks, please stop believing and repeating that pseudo-conservatives are against Big Government; the truth is precisely the opposite. Stop letting these radicals of the right get away with bamboozling America.
"This is only one example of the glaring contradictions at the heart of pseudo-conservative ideology; while they constantly make a public fuss about their opposition to "Big Government" and demand that Republicans "starve the beast", they merrily and aggressively support virtually every increase in the defense budget ever introduced. Pseudo-conservatives have never met a defense increase they didn't like. And yet it seems likely that the largest increases in the federal government are contributed in expansions for "defense" and "national security"."
It is not just likely but virtually certain that it is precisely the expansion of government for war, "defense" and "national security" that most inflates our central government and yet it is precisely these expansions that pseudo-conservatives religiously support. For an example look at Eric Foner's Reconstruction p.23: "The federal budget, amounting to $63 million in 1860, rose to well over $1 billion by 1865. At war's end the federal bureaucracy, with 53,000 employees including Custom House officials, internal revenue agents, clerks, and inspectors, was the largest employer in the nation. And the generous system of pensions for Union veterans... inaugurated in 1865 (and amounting by the turn of the century to one third of the government's entire budget) created both a vast new patronage machine for the Republican party and a broad constituency commited to maintaining the integrity of the national state...."
Don't fool yourself by thinking that because this was a war, and not merely peacetime "defense" spending, that my point is not supported. It is certainly wars that most expand the federal government, but peacetime spending for "defense" and "national security" also hugely expand the central government. Moreover, with pseudo-conservatives like George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and Elliott Abrams in office you can count on more wars as well as huge peacetime "defense" spending.
It is quite notable that pseudo-conservative Buckley vowed to "read Dwight Eisenhower out of the conservative movement." Very revealing when you consider that Eisenhower really was conservative as well as significantly worried about the military-industrial complex.
James Madison, the "father" of our revered Constitution wrote:
"The means of defense against foreign danger historically have become the instruments of tyranny at home."
"It is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to the provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."
"Of all the enemies of public liberty, war is perhaps the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other."
"No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare."
"The truth is that all men having power ought to be mistrusted."
So folks, please stop believing and repeating that pseudo-conservatives are against Big Government; the truth is precisely the opposite. Stop letting these radicals of the right get away with bamboozling America.
Thursday, October 12, 2006
The Dawn of the Pseudo-Conservatives
In an excellent book, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment, Sidney Blumenthal has written of how the American right assumed the label "conservative". On p. 30 he wrote: "Before [William F.] Buckley, there was no common designation for people on the right. (Robert Taft, the old standard-bearer of the Republican right, had always referred to himself as a 'liberal.') National Review, with an assist from Russell Kirk, was largely responsible for giving the believers an identity as 'conservatives'.... The 'conservative' label enabled conservatives to gloss over their incoherence by providing a convenient rubric under which to file everything. Identification as 'conservative' also gave conservatives a self-consciouness as a movement aspiring to power."
What I find remarkable is how easily and apparently unconsciously writers like Blumenthal fell into according the label "conservative" to people they recognized were not actually conservative (see the above two sentences!). They simply acquiesced in the radical right's opportuistically adopting this label. Blumenthal had just written of how, "though they dreaded the leviathan state, [the right] encouraged the building of a permanent and expansive national security state." This is only one example of the glaring contradictions at the heart of pseudo-conservative ideology; while they constantly make a public fuss about their opposition to "Big Government" and demand that Republicans "starve the beast", they merrily and aggressively support virtually every increase in the defense budget ever introduced. Pseudo-conservatives have never met a defense increase they didn't like. And yet it seems likely that the largest increases in the federal government are contributed in expansions for "defense" and "national security".
President Eisenhower, about whom William F. Buckley wrote, "I intend, in an early issue [of the National Review], to read Dwight Eisenhower out of the conservative movement", warned all Americans against the growing powers of the military-industrial complex, and thought this significant enough to focus upon in his 1961 Farewell Address to the American people. Buckley's facile ideology was, "I will not cede more power to the state", unless, that is, it was for fighting communism and building up "defense".
Let's get this straight. The only increases in government that pseudo-conservatives are against are those that regulate large businesses or help citizens who are less privileged. As G. K. Chesterton observed: "The poor have sometimes objected to being governed badly; the rich have always objected to being governed at all." Pseudo-conservatives hate "social security" but love "national security". The Radical Right prattles about its opposition to Big Government involvement in our economy and lauds the "free market" and "laissez faire" principles until, that is, big corporations need some legislation for themselves; then, apparently unnoticed by most of the American public, they become advocates of government action. Does the banking and credit card industry want to collect more from those upon whom they've foisted credit cards? Then we must have new "bankruptcy" legislation. Does the auto industry's obvious mismanagement put them behind foreign competitors in producing fuel efficient cars? Then we must have taxpayer dollars to subsidize research into electric or hydrogen-powered engines. Have the gasoline refiners polluted water aquifers because they added MTBE to gas? Then we must have legislation to protect them from liability lawsuits for the resulting health hazards. Does the drug industry want protection from competition from Canada? Then we must have a Medicare Pharmacy Benefit that outlaws such dangerous market competition. But a higher minimum wage? Universal national health insurance? Bigger punishments for huge oil corporations who have neglected servicing their oil pipeline so they could make higher profits and give their executives more munificent golden parachutes? Horrors! Blasphemy! Interfering in our sacred "free market" system! Kill him who said that!
And it is not just Blumenthal who so easily acquiesces in pseudo-conservatives' purloining the misnomer "conservative." A truly remarkable example is Geoffrey Nunberg. Nunberg is an academic linguist who teaches the study of language to his students at UC Berkeley. He is also Chair of the Usage Panel of the American Heritage Dictionary. Nunberg's most recent book is Talking Right, which "tells the story of a subtle linguistic campaign whose architects--from Spiro Agnew to Karl Rove--have altered the meaning of our everyday political vocabulary." Excellent topic I say; and a very good book as well. But let's look at the subtitle of Nunberg's book: How Conservatives Turned Liberalism into a Tax-Raising, Latte-Drinking, Sushi-Eating, Volvo-Driving, New York Times-Reading, Body-Piercing, Hollywood-Loving, Left-Wing Freak Show. Great subtitle; very amusing; makes excellent points; but it still willingly and perhaps unconsciously commits the sin this very book is meant to describe: it acquiesces in allowing the radical right to wrongly appropriate the label "conservative."
And establishing the meaning of "conservative" is not rocket science. Let's take a look at Mr. Nunberg's own American Heritage Dictionary in its latest online version: conservative = "Favoring traditional views and values; tending to oppose change. Traditional or restrained in style.... Moderate; cautious.... Tending to conserve; preservative." Or let's look at arguably the most authoritative english dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary: "Characterized by a tendency to preserve or keep intact or unchanged; preservative.... The maintenance of existing institutions political and ecclesiastical.... Characterized by caution or moderation."
Most pseudo-conservative policy proposals are the antithesis of these definitions. "Let's bomb Iran." "Let's call North Korea names and wait and see what happens." "Let's abolish the Estate Tax." "Let's 'reform' Social Security." "Let's rattle our sabres at China." "Let's invade Iraq and transform the whole Middle East." And yet most observers of American politics continually accord this glaring misnomer to those on the radical right.
George Orwell wrote: "Political language… is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can… if one jeers loudly enough, send some worn-out and useless phrase -- some jackboot, Achilles' heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno, or other lump of verbal refuse -- into the dustbin, where it belongs." Let us, in the spirit of Orwell, send the mind-numbing and obfuscating American abuse of the term “conservative” into the dustbin, where it belongs.
What I find remarkable is how easily and apparently unconsciously writers like Blumenthal fell into according the label "conservative" to people they recognized were not actually conservative (see the above two sentences!). They simply acquiesced in the radical right's opportuistically adopting this label. Blumenthal had just written of how, "though they dreaded the leviathan state, [the right] encouraged the building of a permanent and expansive national security state." This is only one example of the glaring contradictions at the heart of pseudo-conservative ideology; while they constantly make a public fuss about their opposition to "Big Government" and demand that Republicans "starve the beast", they merrily and aggressively support virtually every increase in the defense budget ever introduced. Pseudo-conservatives have never met a defense increase they didn't like. And yet it seems likely that the largest increases in the federal government are contributed in expansions for "defense" and "national security".
President Eisenhower, about whom William F. Buckley wrote, "I intend, in an early issue [of the National Review], to read Dwight Eisenhower out of the conservative movement", warned all Americans against the growing powers of the military-industrial complex, and thought this significant enough to focus upon in his 1961 Farewell Address to the American people. Buckley's facile ideology was, "I will not cede more power to the state", unless, that is, it was for fighting communism and building up "defense".
Let's get this straight. The only increases in government that pseudo-conservatives are against are those that regulate large businesses or help citizens who are less privileged. As G. K. Chesterton observed: "The poor have sometimes objected to being governed badly; the rich have always objected to being governed at all." Pseudo-conservatives hate "social security" but love "national security". The Radical Right prattles about its opposition to Big Government involvement in our economy and lauds the "free market" and "laissez faire" principles until, that is, big corporations need some legislation for themselves; then, apparently unnoticed by most of the American public, they become advocates of government action. Does the banking and credit card industry want to collect more from those upon whom they've foisted credit cards? Then we must have new "bankruptcy" legislation. Does the auto industry's obvious mismanagement put them behind foreign competitors in producing fuel efficient cars? Then we must have taxpayer dollars to subsidize research into electric or hydrogen-powered engines. Have the gasoline refiners polluted water aquifers because they added MTBE to gas? Then we must have legislation to protect them from liability lawsuits for the resulting health hazards. Does the drug industry want protection from competition from Canada? Then we must have a Medicare Pharmacy Benefit that outlaws such dangerous market competition. But a higher minimum wage? Universal national health insurance? Bigger punishments for huge oil corporations who have neglected servicing their oil pipeline so they could make higher profits and give their executives more munificent golden parachutes? Horrors! Blasphemy! Interfering in our sacred "free market" system! Kill him who said that!
And it is not just Blumenthal who so easily acquiesces in pseudo-conservatives' purloining the misnomer "conservative." A truly remarkable example is Geoffrey Nunberg. Nunberg is an academic linguist who teaches the study of language to his students at UC Berkeley. He is also Chair of the Usage Panel of the American Heritage Dictionary. Nunberg's most recent book is Talking Right, which "tells the story of a subtle linguistic campaign whose architects--from Spiro Agnew to Karl Rove--have altered the meaning of our everyday political vocabulary." Excellent topic I say; and a very good book as well. But let's look at the subtitle of Nunberg's book: How Conservatives Turned Liberalism into a Tax-Raising, Latte-Drinking, Sushi-Eating, Volvo-Driving, New York Times-Reading, Body-Piercing, Hollywood-Loving, Left-Wing Freak Show. Great subtitle; very amusing; makes excellent points; but it still willingly and perhaps unconsciously commits the sin this very book is meant to describe: it acquiesces in allowing the radical right to wrongly appropriate the label "conservative."
And establishing the meaning of "conservative" is not rocket science. Let's take a look at Mr. Nunberg's own American Heritage Dictionary in its latest online version: conservative = "Favoring traditional views and values; tending to oppose change. Traditional or restrained in style.... Moderate; cautious.... Tending to conserve; preservative." Or let's look at arguably the most authoritative english dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary: "Characterized by a tendency to preserve or keep intact or unchanged; preservative.... The maintenance of existing institutions political and ecclesiastical.... Characterized by caution or moderation."
Most pseudo-conservative policy proposals are the antithesis of these definitions. "Let's bomb Iran." "Let's call North Korea names and wait and see what happens." "Let's abolish the Estate Tax." "Let's 'reform' Social Security." "Let's rattle our sabres at China." "Let's invade Iraq and transform the whole Middle East." And yet most observers of American politics continually accord this glaring misnomer to those on the radical right.
George Orwell wrote: "Political language… is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can… if one jeers loudly enough, send some worn-out and useless phrase -- some jackboot, Achilles' heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno, or other lump of verbal refuse -- into the dustbin, where it belongs." Let us, in the spirit of Orwell, send the mind-numbing and obfuscating American abuse of the term “conservative” into the dustbin, where it belongs.
Saturday, October 07, 2006
Pseudo-Conservative Buckley vs. Noam Chomsky
I consider William F. Buckley almost a founding member of the pseudo-conservative pantheon. I would not consider Buckley a "conservative" and as I pointed out in my first post neither did Clinton Rossiter in his Conservatism in America. Rossiter called Buckley an "ultra-conservative" a term I also rejected in my first post in favor of pseudo-conservative, that is, a sham or spurious conservative; one who is apparently conservative but not actually so.
But here's an interesting fact about William F. Buckley. He hosted his TV program "Firing Line" for 33 years, from 1966 to 1999. The right-leaning Hoover Institution at Stanford has a collection of all the programs in a searchable database. Buckley had 1504 programs in all. After Noam Chomsky published his American Power and the New Mandarins in 1969 Buckley had him on his show no. 143 on April 3, 1969. You can see a part of the debate just below separated into two segments(only about 19 minutes of what was a 50 minute program, though an additional 5-6 minutes of the program introduction is available on the Hoover site):
I'd like to make two points about the 19 minutes of this video that is readily available. First, it presents two extremely intelligent and remarkably articulate human beings in debate. To me, Buckley's remarkable mind and verbal facility are placed in the service of pure debating tactics where what counts is impressing an audience with one's cleverness and, hopefully, bullying and distracting one's opponent by constant interruption and invitations to go off on tangents. Chomsky, on the other hand carefully addresses each of Buckley's conceptual and historical points.
But here's an interesting fact about William F. Buckley. He hosted his TV program "Firing Line" for 33 years, from 1966 to 1999. The right-leaning Hoover Institution at Stanford has a collection of all the programs in a searchable database. Buckley had 1504 programs in all. After Noam Chomsky published his American Power and the New Mandarins in 1969 Buckley had him on his show no. 143 on April 3, 1969. You can see a part of the debate just below separated into two segments(only about 19 minutes of what was a 50 minute program, though an additional 5-6 minutes of the program introduction is available on the Hoover site):
I'd like to make two points about the 19 minutes of this video that is readily available. First, it presents two extremely intelligent and remarkably articulate human beings in debate. To me, Buckley's remarkable mind and verbal facility are placed in the service of pure debating tactics where what counts is impressing an audience with one's cleverness and, hopefully, bullying and distracting one's opponent by constant interruption and invitations to go off on tangents. Chomsky, on the other hand carefully addresses each of Buckley's conceptual and historical points.
Wednesday, October 04, 2006
Why Haven’t Robert Pape’s Results Received More Attention?
Perhaps way back in the 60s and 70s there was something like a "liberal bias" in the media, although I think of it more as a "common sense" bias. But with Reagan's repeal of the "Fairness Doctrine", the broadcasts of Rush Limbaugh et. al. and the rise of Rupert Murdoch's Fox "News" there is clearly a pseudo-conservative bias in the media today. If you doubt this try this thought experiment: imagine what would have been said about Bill Clinton if he had done the types of things George W. Bush has done. Clinton was nearly crucified by the media and the Radical Right for losing $200,000 in a land investment BEFORE he was president. They spent 75$ Mil, took 7.5 years and four different "Independent" Counsels to investigate this investment loss until they finally found something that had NOTHING to do with it, his affair with Lewinsky. George W. Bush has done just about every bad thing a president can do and the media still treats him quite respectfully. The media certainly did not treat Clinton with anything like the respect they accord Bush even though several experts on the history of the U.S. presidency have opined that George W. Bush is likely one of the four or five worst presidents in American history(See the exchange attributed to Robert Dallek and David Donald on p. 616 of Kitty Kelly, The Family: The Real Story of the Bush Dynasty).
Here is a glaring example of what I see as pseudo-conservative media bias that has a critical bearing on the most significant foreign policy issues of our day, the "war on terror". Robert Pape’s Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism at University of Chicago put every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003 into a database (315 attacks in all including 71 al-Qaeda attackers) and studied them intensively. His results were published in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. This must be the most exhaustive, empirical, and methodologically sound study of suicide terrorism available. Given our current preoccupation with the “war on terror” the relevance of this study could hardly be greater. The book has received many good reviews but the fact that it addressed most of the important questions about the sources of suicide terrorism should have made its results much more widely publicized. Perhaps Pape’s conclusions were not what the powers that be wanted to hear. (Please see my post from yesterday for more of Pape's conclusions.)
Pape looked directly at the question of whether Islamic fundamentalism was the primary source of the kind of terrorism involved in the 9/11 attack. In his chapter, “Demystifying al-Qaeda”, after careful statistical examination of his data, he concluded (p. 125): “Examination of al-Qaeda’s pool of suicide terrorists and its mobilization appeals shows that American military policy is stronger than Islamic fundamentalism in recruiting individuals willing to carry out suicide terrorist operations against the United States (emphasis added). Truly transnational al-Qaeda suicide terrorists are few, while the overwhelming majority emanate from a narrow range of Muslim countries, those with American combat troops stationed on or immediately adjacent to their soil and those that received substantial backing from the United States.”
Let us examine that last sentence more carefully. Pape’s results show that the stationing of American combat troops was the most important factor in accounting for suicide terrorism. But in a secondary analysis he found that many terrorists, where American combat troops were not a factor, came from countries with whom the U.S. had a close alliance including the granting of substantial amounts of economic and military aid to the government in power. He stated (p. 116): “The striking result from this analysis is that nineteen (79 percent) of al-Qaeda’s transnational suicide terrorists—those not associated with American military presence—are from four Muslim countries [Egypt, Pakistan (post-2001), Indonesia and Morocco] all of which have regimes that are close allies of the United States and all of whose suicide terrorists are associated with the cause of national liberation in their own countries. This suggests that al-Qaeda’s truly transnational appeal for martyrdom is thin and springs mainly from nationalist causes (emphasis added).”
This suggests that either the stationing of American military troops or America’s financial and military aid are the most significant factors in explaining al-Qaeda’s terrorism. Has this been widely publicized in the media? Perhaps I wasn’t paying attention but I haven’t seen a lot about this. It is dramatically different from the analyses of the sources of terrorism I’ve heard on the media.
Pape continued (p. 125): “American military policy in the Persian Gulf was the pivotal factor leading to September 11. Although Islamic fundamentalism mattered, the stationing of tens of thousands of American combat troops on the Arabian Penninsula from 1990 to 2001 probably increased the risk of al-Qaeda attack against Americans, including the events of September 11, 2001, ten to twenty times…. This finding also has important implications for American policy toward Iraq: the longer American combat forces remain in the country, the greater the risk that Iraqi suicide terrorists will seek to mount operations to kill Americans in the United States.”
This careful study contradicts what we are told many times each day: that Islamic fundamentalism is THE source of suicide terrorism. Why hasn't this study received more attention?????
Here is a glaring example of what I see as pseudo-conservative media bias that has a critical bearing on the most significant foreign policy issues of our day, the "war on terror". Robert Pape’s Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism at University of Chicago put every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003 into a database (315 attacks in all including 71 al-Qaeda attackers) and studied them intensively. His results were published in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. This must be the most exhaustive, empirical, and methodologically sound study of suicide terrorism available. Given our current preoccupation with the “war on terror” the relevance of this study could hardly be greater. The book has received many good reviews but the fact that it addressed most of the important questions about the sources of suicide terrorism should have made its results much more widely publicized. Perhaps Pape’s conclusions were not what the powers that be wanted to hear. (Please see my post from yesterday for more of Pape's conclusions.)
Pape looked directly at the question of whether Islamic fundamentalism was the primary source of the kind of terrorism involved in the 9/11 attack. In his chapter, “Demystifying al-Qaeda”, after careful statistical examination of his data, he concluded (p. 125): “Examination of al-Qaeda’s pool of suicide terrorists and its mobilization appeals shows that American military policy is stronger than Islamic fundamentalism in recruiting individuals willing to carry out suicide terrorist operations against the United States (emphasis added). Truly transnational al-Qaeda suicide terrorists are few, while the overwhelming majority emanate from a narrow range of Muslim countries, those with American combat troops stationed on or immediately adjacent to their soil and those that received substantial backing from the United States.”
Let us examine that last sentence more carefully. Pape’s results show that the stationing of American combat troops was the most important factor in accounting for suicide terrorism. But in a secondary analysis he found that many terrorists, where American combat troops were not a factor, came from countries with whom the U.S. had a close alliance including the granting of substantial amounts of economic and military aid to the government in power. He stated (p. 116): “The striking result from this analysis is that nineteen (79 percent) of al-Qaeda’s transnational suicide terrorists—those not associated with American military presence—are from four Muslim countries [Egypt, Pakistan (post-2001), Indonesia and Morocco] all of which have regimes that are close allies of the United States and all of whose suicide terrorists are associated with the cause of national liberation in their own countries. This suggests that al-Qaeda’s truly transnational appeal for martyrdom is thin and springs mainly from nationalist causes (emphasis added).”
This suggests that either the stationing of American military troops or America’s financial and military aid are the most significant factors in explaining al-Qaeda’s terrorism. Has this been widely publicized in the media? Perhaps I wasn’t paying attention but I haven’t seen a lot about this. It is dramatically different from the analyses of the sources of terrorism I’ve heard on the media.
Pape continued (p. 125): “American military policy in the Persian Gulf was the pivotal factor leading to September 11. Although Islamic fundamentalism mattered, the stationing of tens of thousands of American combat troops on the Arabian Penninsula from 1990 to 2001 probably increased the risk of al-Qaeda attack against Americans, including the events of September 11, 2001, ten to twenty times…. This finding also has important implications for American policy toward Iraq: the longer American combat forces remain in the country, the greater the risk that Iraqi suicide terrorists will seek to mount operations to kill Americans in the United States.”
This careful study contradicts what we are told many times each day: that Islamic fundamentalism is THE source of suicide terrorism. Why hasn't this study received more attention?????
Tuesday, October 03, 2006
Pseudo-Conservative Ideology Does Strange Things to Rationality
It is likely impossible for severe ideologues to assess foreign situations rationally and devise strategies tailored to an accurate appraisal of the situation. This is why it is unwise for the American voter to put ideologically driven people in power. Unfortunately, it is ideologues of the right, taking advantage of the hypernationalism and fear of the other they are so skilled at arousing, who have been in control of foreign policy for 18 of the last 26 years.
When the Reagan administration took office the enemy was the "evil empire" or the "international Communist conspiracy". (The Soviet Union was an opponent, but one whose threat was frequently exaggerated and distorted by the radical right for its own purposes.) Today the radical right has conjured up the international Islamo-Fascist conspiracy. I do not doubt that there are suicide terrorists who conspire to attack the U.S., but--if we are to protect ourselves rationally--it is essential that we not merely accept the ideologically driven version of the threat created by pseudo-conservatives.
Interestingly, Robert Pape (pp. 241-246) in Dying to Win:The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism carefully examined the theory of terrorism put forward by David Frum and Richard Perle in An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror. David Frum and Richard Perle are excellent examples of the pseudo-conservative radical right: Frum as a speech writer for George W. Bush played a role in inventing the "axis of evil" phrase and Perle is a perfect example of the pseudo-con whose career goes back to the 1970s.
Pape carefully repeats and then examines the basic premises in Frum and Perle’s argument: 1) the “cause [of terrorism] is militant Islam”; 2) “the roots of Muslim rage are to be found in Islam itself…. The Islamic world has lagged further and further behind the Christian West”; 3) “The distinction between Islamic terrorism against Israel, on the one hand, and Islamic terrorism against the United States and Europe, on the other, cannot be sustained”; 4) “This strain seeks to overthrow our civilization and remake the nations of the West into Islamic societies, imposing on the whole world its religion and its law.” Pape stated: “The solution, Perle and Frum contend, is regime change: ‘We must move boldly against [Iran] and against all the other sponsors of terrorism as well: Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.’”
Pape, who put together the most exhaustive database including every suicide terrorist attack since 1980, went on to assess their analysis: “This argument is fatally flawed. First, al-Qaeda’s suicide terrorists have not come from the most populous Islamic fundamentalist populations in the world [Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Egypt and Nigeria], but mainly from the Muslim countries with heavy American combat presence [Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries “where the United States has stationed heavy combat troops”]…. If Islamic fundamentalism is driving al-Qaeda’s suicide terrorism, then we would expect a close relationship between the world’s largest Islamic fundamentalist populations and the nationality of al-Qaeda’s suicide terrorists. However this is not the case….”
“Second, Islamic fundamentalism has not created a monolithic terrorism threat against the United States or other Western countries…. When one studies the various suicide terrorist campaigns by Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda what stands out is not that these groups share military resources or act in concert, like a monolithic movement. Instead, what stands out is that each is driven by essentially nationalist goals to compel target democracies to withdraw military forces from their particular homeland.”
“Third, the idea that all Muslims around the world are quietly anti-American because Islam encourages hatred for American values for democracy and free markets does not square with the facts. Indeed, robust evidence shows that American military policies, not revulsion against Western political and economic values, are driving anti-Americanism among Muslims.” Pape went on to discuss polling among Muslims concerning world trade, free markets and democracy showing high numbers in favor of these in Muslim countries. He also presented a poll showing the severe drop in Muslims with a favorable view of the U.S. from 2000 to 2004.
Unless “our freedoms” in the United States were only established in 2000 it is difficult to find evidence of President Bush’s contention on September 20, 2001 : “They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” Since these freedoms were established in the Constitution well over 200 years ago why did the U.S.’s favorability among Muslims drop seriously in 2002 and 2003? Pape presented data supporting the following conclusion: “Rather, the taproot is American military policy. Overwhelming majorities across a range of Muslim countries believe that the United States conquered Iraq to control its oil or to help Israel rather than to end terrorism or promote democracy, and fear that their country might be next.”
Pape continued: “Fourth, the idea that Islamic fundamentalism is on the verge of world domination and poses a realistic treat to impose Islamic laws in the United States and Europe is pure fantasy. Some [Muslim] radicals may harbor such delusions. Some fearmongers may use such delusions to whip up hysteria. But these are delusions nonetheless.” [Hmmm. I wonder which "fearmongers" he has in mind?]
Finally Pape concluded: “Fifth, and most important, an attempt to transform Muslim societies through regime change is likely to dramatically increase the threat we face. The root cause of suicide terrorism is foreign occupation and the threat that foreign military presence poses to the local community’s way of life. Hence, any policy that seeks to conquer Muslim societies in order, deliberately, to transform their culture is folly.”
Thus, pseudo-conservatives like Frum and Perle manage to completely misunderstand the terrorist threat that we face and perversely misguide us about how to comabt it. Pape argued that what Frum and Perle recommend, moving "boldly against [Iran] and against all the other sponsors of terrorism as well: Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia”, is precisely the action most likely to increase the terrorist threat. If one looks carefully at the foreign policy recommendations of the radical right since World War II I think it is actually quite typical that the policies they so vigorously recommend have precisely the opposite effects to those they expect. If we want to make our world problems worse then we should certainly do what the Richard Perles of this world recommend.
When the Reagan administration took office the enemy was the "evil empire" or the "international Communist conspiracy". (The Soviet Union was an opponent, but one whose threat was frequently exaggerated and distorted by the radical right for its own purposes.) Today the radical right has conjured up the international Islamo-Fascist conspiracy. I do not doubt that there are suicide terrorists who conspire to attack the U.S., but--if we are to protect ourselves rationally--it is essential that we not merely accept the ideologically driven version of the threat created by pseudo-conservatives.
Interestingly, Robert Pape (pp. 241-246) in Dying to Win:The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism carefully examined the theory of terrorism put forward by David Frum and Richard Perle in An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror. David Frum and Richard Perle are excellent examples of the pseudo-conservative radical right: Frum as a speech writer for George W. Bush played a role in inventing the "axis of evil" phrase and Perle is a perfect example of the pseudo-con whose career goes back to the 1970s.
Pape carefully repeats and then examines the basic premises in Frum and Perle’s argument: 1) the “cause [of terrorism] is militant Islam”; 2) “the roots of Muslim rage are to be found in Islam itself…. The Islamic world has lagged further and further behind the Christian West”; 3) “The distinction between Islamic terrorism against Israel, on the one hand, and Islamic terrorism against the United States and Europe, on the other, cannot be sustained”; 4) “This strain seeks to overthrow our civilization and remake the nations of the West into Islamic societies, imposing on the whole world its religion and its law.” Pape stated: “The solution, Perle and Frum contend, is regime change: ‘We must move boldly against [Iran] and against all the other sponsors of terrorism as well: Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.’”
Pape, who put together the most exhaustive database including every suicide terrorist attack since 1980, went on to assess their analysis: “This argument is fatally flawed. First, al-Qaeda’s suicide terrorists have not come from the most populous Islamic fundamentalist populations in the world [Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Egypt and Nigeria], but mainly from the Muslim countries with heavy American combat presence [Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries “where the United States has stationed heavy combat troops”]…. If Islamic fundamentalism is driving al-Qaeda’s suicide terrorism, then we would expect a close relationship between the world’s largest Islamic fundamentalist populations and the nationality of al-Qaeda’s suicide terrorists. However this is not the case….”
“Second, Islamic fundamentalism has not created a monolithic terrorism threat against the United States or other Western countries…. When one studies the various suicide terrorist campaigns by Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda what stands out is not that these groups share military resources or act in concert, like a monolithic movement. Instead, what stands out is that each is driven by essentially nationalist goals to compel target democracies to withdraw military forces from their particular homeland.”
“Third, the idea that all Muslims around the world are quietly anti-American because Islam encourages hatred for American values for democracy and free markets does not square with the facts. Indeed, robust evidence shows that American military policies, not revulsion against Western political and economic values, are driving anti-Americanism among Muslims.” Pape went on to discuss polling among Muslims concerning world trade, free markets and democracy showing high numbers in favor of these in Muslim countries. He also presented a poll showing the severe drop in Muslims with a favorable view of the U.S. from 2000 to 2004.
Unless “our freedoms” in the United States were only established in 2000 it is difficult to find evidence of President Bush’s contention on September 20, 2001 : “They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” Since these freedoms were established in the Constitution well over 200 years ago why did the U.S.’s favorability among Muslims drop seriously in 2002 and 2003? Pape presented data supporting the following conclusion: “Rather, the taproot is American military policy. Overwhelming majorities across a range of Muslim countries believe that the United States conquered Iraq to control its oil or to help Israel rather than to end terrorism or promote democracy, and fear that their country might be next.”
Pape continued: “Fourth, the idea that Islamic fundamentalism is on the verge of world domination and poses a realistic treat to impose Islamic laws in the United States and Europe is pure fantasy. Some [Muslim] radicals may harbor such delusions. Some fearmongers may use such delusions to whip up hysteria. But these are delusions nonetheless.” [Hmmm. I wonder which "fearmongers" he has in mind?]
Finally Pape concluded: “Fifth, and most important, an attempt to transform Muslim societies through regime change is likely to dramatically increase the threat we face. The root cause of suicide terrorism is foreign occupation and the threat that foreign military presence poses to the local community’s way of life. Hence, any policy that seeks to conquer Muslim societies in order, deliberately, to transform their culture is folly.”
Thus, pseudo-conservatives like Frum and Perle manage to completely misunderstand the terrorist threat that we face and perversely misguide us about how to comabt it. Pape argued that what Frum and Perle recommend, moving "boldly against [Iran] and against all the other sponsors of terrorism as well: Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia”, is precisely the action most likely to increase the terrorist threat. If one looks carefully at the foreign policy recommendations of the radical right since World War II I think it is actually quite typical that the policies they so vigorously recommend have precisely the opposite effects to those they expect. If we want to make our world problems worse then we should certainly do what the Richard Perles of this world recommend.
Saturday, September 30, 2006
Why are Pseudo-Conservatives Addicted to "Toughness"?
In reducing the large panoply of foreign policy tools to the threatened or actual use of military force (see my post entitled Why "Conservatives Can't Do Foreign Policy, pseudo-conservatives often seem addicted to appearing "tough" rather than "soft", "flaccid", "feckless", etc. (The latter three terms have all been taken from pseudo-con critiques of other administrations foreign policy.) What is this preoccupation with appearing "tough"? It is undoubtedly different for different pseudo-cons but interestingly George W. Bush has at least twice been seen as a "narcissistic personality disorder". I am a clinical psychologist and psychotherapist so I have some expertise in this matter and I believe both these analyses of Bush merit consideration. One, by middle east historian Juan Cole, appeared in his blog, Informed Comment, on August 22, 2006, and is pretty good for a non-mental health professional. The second that I have seen came from psychologist Stephen Soldz on ZNet.
Here is a relevant bit from Soldz: "psychoanalysts have learned that narcissism is intimately connected with fear of one's weakness and vulnerability, and with aggression toward the other whose individuality is obliterated by the narcissism. As the weakness and vulnerability needs to be kept out of awareness, narcissism contributes to another process that poses dangers for narcissistic leaders like President Bush in that their narcissism contributes to an ignoring of reality, of possibility of error or other indicators of potential weakness."
George W. Bush's need to appear "strong", "resolute", tough and unbending are widely recognized. Here are a couple of revealing examples. In Ron Suskind's book on Paul O'Neill's experience as the first of Bush's Secretaries of the Treasury, The Price of Loyalty, there is a report of the very first meeting of the National Security Council occurring just 10 days after Bush's first inauguration (pp. 70-75): the meeting was to be about "Mideast Policy" and there was a brief discussion of how to approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Bush said his policy would be to disengage and let the combatants "work it out on their own." Secretary of State Powell said such a move "would unleash Sharon and the Israeli army. 'The consequences of that could be dire [said Powell]... especially for the Palestinians.' Bush shrugged. 'Maybe that's the best way to get things back in balance.' Powell seemed startled. 'Sometimes a show of strength by one side can really clarify things,' Bush said."
George W. Bush's belief in a "show of strength" may be further illuminated in another anecdote, again provided by Ron Suskind, this time in his The One Percent Doctrine (p. 215). A classmate of Bush's at Harvard Business School tells of playing basketball as captain of a team that played against another intramural team of which Bush was captain: "The game was tight. The other team's captain, Gary Engle... went up for a shot. Bush slugged him--an elbow to the mouth, knocking him to the parquet. 'What the hell are you doing?' Engle remembers saying.... Bush just smiled. Moments later, at the other end of the court, Engle went up for a rebound and felt someone chop his legs out from under him. Bush again." Later in his business career Engle ran into Jeb Bush in Florida and told him the story. "Jeb kind of laughed, Engle recalled. 'In Texas, they call guys like George 'a hard case'. It wasn't easy being his brother, either. He truly enjoys getting people to knuckle under'."
I would have to agree that these anecdotes support the view of Bush as someone whose "fear of one's weakness and vulnerability [results in] aggression toward the other whose individuality is obliterated by the narcissism." Bush's need for swagger and a big show of toughness--"Bring em on"--is not the expression of someone who is secure in his strength but one who secretly feels weak and vulnerable and covers it up with a show of bravado. In the case of George W. Bush at any rate, "toughness" in foreign policies seems built into a narcissistic personality.
Here is a relevant bit from Soldz: "psychoanalysts have learned that narcissism is intimately connected with fear of one's weakness and vulnerability, and with aggression toward the other whose individuality is obliterated by the narcissism. As the weakness and vulnerability needs to be kept out of awareness, narcissism contributes to another process that poses dangers for narcissistic leaders like President Bush in that their narcissism contributes to an ignoring of reality, of possibility of error or other indicators of potential weakness."
George W. Bush's need to appear "strong", "resolute", tough and unbending are widely recognized. Here are a couple of revealing examples. In Ron Suskind's book on Paul O'Neill's experience as the first of Bush's Secretaries of the Treasury, The Price of Loyalty, there is a report of the very first meeting of the National Security Council occurring just 10 days after Bush's first inauguration (pp. 70-75): the meeting was to be about "Mideast Policy" and there was a brief discussion of how to approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Bush said his policy would be to disengage and let the combatants "work it out on their own." Secretary of State Powell said such a move "would unleash Sharon and the Israeli army. 'The consequences of that could be dire [said Powell]... especially for the Palestinians.' Bush shrugged. 'Maybe that's the best way to get things back in balance.' Powell seemed startled. 'Sometimes a show of strength by one side can really clarify things,' Bush said."
George W. Bush's belief in a "show of strength" may be further illuminated in another anecdote, again provided by Ron Suskind, this time in his The One Percent Doctrine (p. 215). A classmate of Bush's at Harvard Business School tells of playing basketball as captain of a team that played against another intramural team of which Bush was captain: "The game was tight. The other team's captain, Gary Engle... went up for a shot. Bush slugged him--an elbow to the mouth, knocking him to the parquet. 'What the hell are you doing?' Engle remembers saying.... Bush just smiled. Moments later, at the other end of the court, Engle went up for a rebound and felt someone chop his legs out from under him. Bush again." Later in his business career Engle ran into Jeb Bush in Florida and told him the story. "Jeb kind of laughed, Engle recalled. 'In Texas, they call guys like George 'a hard case'. It wasn't easy being his brother, either. He truly enjoys getting people to knuckle under'."
I would have to agree that these anecdotes support the view of Bush as someone whose "fear of one's weakness and vulnerability [results in] aggression toward the other whose individuality is obliterated by the narcissism." Bush's need for swagger and a big show of toughness--"Bring em on"--is not the expression of someone who is secure in his strength but one who secretly feels weak and vulnerable and covers it up with a show of bravado. In the case of George W. Bush at any rate, "toughness" in foreign policies seems built into a narcissistic personality.
Friday, September 29, 2006
"We don't do 'engagement'."
An excellent example of pseudo-conservative allergy to the tools of diplomacy was described in James Mann's book, Rise of the Vulcans. On p. 280 Mann describes the Bush II administration's abrupt change in policy toward North Korea: "On the day after Kim Dae Jung [president of South Korea and strong advocate of engagement with the North Koreans] visited the White House [March 2001], a senior official pointedly told a reporter that North Korea was not a democracy and that the new administration had doubts about the extent to which it should do business with its leaders. During the early months of the new administration one of America's leading military commanders came home from overseas for a visit to the Pentagon and was startled to be told, "We don't do 'engagement.'"
The idea that the US should not "do business" with leaders of non-democratic governments is a great example of the Bush II administration's partial blindness and disrespect for any need to be consistent. In the past as well as in the present there are plenty of non-democratic governments with whom we have been thoroughly willing to "do business". The former Soviet Union and the current regime in China are only two examples. Thus the fact that North Korea is not a democracy does not by itself require us to avoid "engagement" with it.
There are obviously many things we do not like about the North Korean leadership and justifiably so, but you do not avoid negotiations with opponents just because you disagree with them; it is precisely the fact of disagreements that makes negotiations, "talk", engagement, etc., necessary. Just because we talk to an opponent does not remove our ability to threaten or use military action to coerce them to come to an accomodation. Unless you are an immature, ignorant, insecure, person or nation, you do not need to fear talking with opponents. Teddy Roosevelt recommended we "Speak softly but carry a big stick." The US obviously has the world's biggest stick and we have an abundance of blandishments we can also offer our opponents. It is some kind of psychological disoreder that makes the pseudo-conservatives so allergic to talking with our opponents.
"Engagement", negotiations, "talk" or whatever term you wish is just one more basic tool of foreign policy that pseudo-conservatives don't believe in and this severely limits their ability to conduct foreign policy.
The idea that the US should not "do business" with leaders of non-democratic governments is a great example of the Bush II administration's partial blindness and disrespect for any need to be consistent. In the past as well as in the present there are plenty of non-democratic governments with whom we have been thoroughly willing to "do business". The former Soviet Union and the current regime in China are only two examples. Thus the fact that North Korea is not a democracy does not by itself require us to avoid "engagement" with it.
There are obviously many things we do not like about the North Korean leadership and justifiably so, but you do not avoid negotiations with opponents just because you disagree with them; it is precisely the fact of disagreements that makes negotiations, "talk", engagement, etc., necessary. Just because we talk to an opponent does not remove our ability to threaten or use military action to coerce them to come to an accomodation. Unless you are an immature, ignorant, insecure, person or nation, you do not need to fear talking with opponents. Teddy Roosevelt recommended we "Speak softly but carry a big stick." The US obviously has the world's biggest stick and we have an abundance of blandishments we can also offer our opponents. It is some kind of psychological disoreder that makes the pseudo-conservatives so allergic to talking with our opponents.
"Engagement", negotiations, "talk" or whatever term you wish is just one more basic tool of foreign policy that pseudo-conservatives don't believe in and this severely limits their ability to conduct foreign policy.
Thursday, September 28, 2006
Why Pseudo-Conservatives Can't Do Foreign Policy
In a widely read article in Washington Monthly (July/August 2006) political scientist Alan Wolfe tried to explain “Why Conservatives Can’t Govern”. Wolfe wrote: “Contemporary conservatism is first and foremost about shrinking the size and reach of the federal government” and cutting taxes. Ideologically, this is clearly true, even if their actions aren’t always consistent with their beliefs. Wolfe went on, claiming that “like all politicians, conservatives, once in office, find themselves under constant pressure from constituents to use government to improve their lives. This puts conservatives in the awkward position of managing government agencies whose missions—indeed, whose very existence—they believe to be illegitimate. Contemporary conservatism is a walking contradiction. Unable to shrink government but unwilling to improve it, conservatives attempt to split the difference, expanding government for political gain, but always in ways that validate their disregard for the very thing they are expanding…. Conservatives cannot govern well for the same reason that vegetarians cannot prepare a world-class boeuf bourguignon: If you believe that what you are called upon to do is wrong, you are not likely to do it very well.”
This is an idea worth consideration. Perhaps pseudo-conservatives frequently govern badly because they do not really believe in many of the basic tools of modern government. Although Wolf’s best arguments were applied to domestic issues--like FEMA/Katrina mismanagement and prescription benefits for seniors that frequently seemed more attuned to benefits for drug companies--he tried to apply them to the mismanagement of the Iraq war as well. Here he placed emphasis upon Rumsfeld’s trying to prosecute war while “low-balling… troop estimates”; or, “relying on government but refusing to pay for it.” While Wolfe’s points about the Iraq war are interesting perhaps there are deeper reasons pseudo-conservatives frequently don’t “do” foreign policy well either; and these reasons run quite parallel with Wolfe’s analysis of domestic policy.
This "blook" (blog preparatory to a book) attempts to make the case that pseudo-conservatives don’t conduct foreign policy well because they don’t believe in most of it either; that is, they do not believe in the usefulness of most of the basic tools of foreign policy. Instead, pseudo-conservatives reduce foreign policy primarily to military policy; they support a big defense budget and buildup of military forces but they don’t trust most of the other crucial aspects of foreign policy. In the post-cold war world the US seems to be taking on ever greater world responsibilities. These responsibilities involve all of the crucial aspects of foreign policy: negotiation, engagement, nation-building, monitoring and verification to ensure negotiated agreements are being complied with, etc. (For an excellent discussion of what is necessary, and from a military leader rather than a civilian leader, see The Battle for Peace by General Anthony Zinni. Although Zinni supported Bush/Cheney in 2000 he became very disenchanted with them over their approach to Iraq [Ricks, 2006].)
The Case of the Iraq War
Since pseudo-conservatives “militarize” foreign policy, it becomes more understandable that they placed almost sole emphasis upon planning the military aspects of the Iraq war. Woodward (2004) describes in immense detail how Bush, Rumsfeld, and Franks spent about 15 months planning and re-planning for the military portion of their Iraq invasion. Rumsfeld obsessively went through iteration after iteration of the war plan, honing it, sharpening it, examining all of its assumptions, planning for every contingency—except one, what was the plan for after Saddam was gone? General Zinni, who was Tommy Franks’ predecessor as Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM from 1997-2000, wrote (2006, p. 26), “I had been called before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [on February 11, 2003] to give my views on the coming [Iraq] war. As I waited…I listened to the testimony from… planners from the State and Defense Departments. ‘Planners?’ I thought with horror as I listened to them. ‘The planners have no plan. They’re not thinking about what comes after we’ve invaded Iraq and taken Baghdad.’”
While the Bush II administration had a well worked out plan for making war and toppling Saddam (the easier military portion of the war in Iraq given our immense military superiority), after they took Baghdad and Saddam fled it became clear they had no viable plan to assume power in the political vacuum they had created. They seemed to just stand around and wait for something good to happen. Thomas Ricks, in his careful study of the Iraq war, Fiasco, wrote the following (p. 136):
"During this period [of looting in Baghdad], the U.S. military was perceptibly losing its recent gains; it gave the sense that it really didn’t know what to do next and was waiting to pass the mission to someone else. ‘A finite supply of goodwill toward the Americans evaporated with the passing of each anarchic day,’ Lt. Nathaniel Flick, an elite force recon Marine officer, wrote of being in Baghdad during this time."
"‘There wasn’t any plan,’ recalled a Special Operations officer who was in Baghdad at the time. ‘Everyone was just kind of waiting around. Everybody thought they’d be going home soon.’ Looking back on the period, he recalled it as a slow loss of momentum. ‘It wasn’t like all hell broke loose. It was more like the situation eroded.’"
"Rumsfeld’s fundamental misunderstanding of the looting of Iraq, and the casual manner in which he expressed it [‘Stuff happens’], not only set back U.S. forces tactically, but also damaged the strategic standing of the United States, commented Fred Ikle…. ‘America lost most of its prestige and respect in that episode. To pacify a conquered country, the victor’s prestige and dignity is absolutely crucial.’ This criticism was leveled by a man who not only had impeccable credentials in conservative national security circles, but actually had brought Wolfowitz to Washington…."
The reason for lack of post-war planning was certainly not because responsibility for it was too widely dispersed. Donald Rumsfeld and his Pentagon, strongly supported by Vice President Cheney’s office, had successfully “marginalized” Colin Powell’s State Department and had centralized virtually all war power in its own hands (Woodward, 2004, pp. 79, 149). Even post-war planning was made the Pentagon’s responsibility on January 20, 2003 (Woodward, 2004, p. 283), even though the State Department had been planning for the post-war for some time (David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq, 2005 and Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory, 2005). But a measure of the relative importance of war and post-war can be seen by comparing the dates when each formally began; planning for war began on November 21, 2001 (Woodward, 2004, pp. 1-5), while effective planning for post-war did not begin until two months before the war on January 20, 2003 (Ibid. pp. 280-4). Effective planning for post-war did not start until January 2003 because the Pentagon ignored previous State Department planning (many accounts agree on this but just one is Phillips, 2005, p. 126) and even refused to work with most State Department personnel (Woodward, 2004, pp. 283-4).
Thomas Ricks (2006, p.184-5) tried to explain the failure to plan for post-war in Iraq as due to the Bush II administration’s lack of appreciation for the importance of strategy:
"Strategy was seen as something vague and intellectual, at best a secondary issue, when in fact it was the core of the task they faced. It was the same sort of limited thinking that had led the Bush team first to focus in 2002 and early 2003 almost exclusively on its plan of attack for Iraq, rather than on the more difficult but crucial consolidation of that victory, and that also led it to make wildly unrealistic assumptions about postinvasion Iraq, and then fail to develop operational plans as a fallback if its assumptions proved incorrect."
While Ricks is undoubtedly correct that these leaders failed in strategic thinking, he begs the question of why they failed to think about their ultimate strategic goal: what would they do once Saddam was gone? It’s worthwhile considering the possibility that the reason they failed to do so was because this is precisely the area where they are weakest. Foreign policy to pseudo-conservatives primarily consists of building up the military and using military power. They “don’t do engagement” (James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 280); they commonly condemn “negotiation” as “talking for the sake of talking” or as “appeasement”; they are so suspicious and mistrustful of adversaries that they are often found saying our adversaries won’t “negotiate in good faith” (Kristol, 2006, It’s Our War); they tend to denigrate “nation-building”. Recall that “nation-building” was something Bush pointedly campaigned against in the 2000 debates with Gore. If they in fact reduce foreign policy to the use of military power is it any wonder that the Bush II administration focused “in 2002 and early 2003 almost exclusively on its plan of attack for Iraq”, made “wildly unrealistic assumptions about postinvasion Iraq”, and failed “to develop operational plans as a fallback if its assumptions proved incorrect” (Ricks)? For pseudocons to focus almost entirely upon the military invasion but be unrealistic about complicated post-invasion nation-building is just what we should have expected. Pseudo-conservatives can’t do foreign policy for a similar reason that they can’t govern: they don’t believe in most of the primary tools of foreign policy.
What are the basic “tools” of foreign policy?
There are certainly some basic tools that any country uses to pursue its foreign policy goals. The following is not meant to be an exhaustive list but these are among the obvious tools of foreign policy.
A. Negotiating with opponents, whether one chooses to call this “talking”, “having dialogue”, “engagement”, or any other such term. Through such dialogue we are trying to assess and understand how our opponents see the world, as well as come to agreements, treaties, etc. (“Know thine enemy” is a maxim as important as “Know thyself”.)
B. Making public statements to inform our friends and opponents of our policy. (“Speak softly and carry a big stick” or engage in name-calling and public bluster.)
C. Collecting and analyzing intelligence to be used as the basis of U.S. foreign policy.
D. Providing aid to foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to support activities we see as constructive. “Nation-building” would be included here.
E. Planning and cooperating with international institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, NATO and the International Court of Justice.
F. Monitoring, inspecting and verifying to ensure that others are behaving as they have agreed to behave.
G. Planning and collaborating with allies (and potential allies) for joint cooperative actions.
H. Maintaining embassies and other foreign policy institutions overseas.
I. Cooperation with other countries in legal actions against international lawbreakers such as terrorists.
J. Building up our military power and keeping it effectively modernized; this power can then be used to either threaten military action or to actually use military force.
What do pseudo-conservatives think of such basic instruments of foreign policy? Later posts will address this question.
This is an idea worth consideration. Perhaps pseudo-conservatives frequently govern badly because they do not really believe in many of the basic tools of modern government. Although Wolf’s best arguments were applied to domestic issues--like FEMA/Katrina mismanagement and prescription benefits for seniors that frequently seemed more attuned to benefits for drug companies--he tried to apply them to the mismanagement of the Iraq war as well. Here he placed emphasis upon Rumsfeld’s trying to prosecute war while “low-balling… troop estimates”; or, “relying on government but refusing to pay for it.” While Wolfe’s points about the Iraq war are interesting perhaps there are deeper reasons pseudo-conservatives frequently don’t “do” foreign policy well either; and these reasons run quite parallel with Wolfe’s analysis of domestic policy.
This "blook" (blog preparatory to a book) attempts to make the case that pseudo-conservatives don’t conduct foreign policy well because they don’t believe in most of it either; that is, they do not believe in the usefulness of most of the basic tools of foreign policy. Instead, pseudo-conservatives reduce foreign policy primarily to military policy; they support a big defense budget and buildup of military forces but they don’t trust most of the other crucial aspects of foreign policy. In the post-cold war world the US seems to be taking on ever greater world responsibilities. These responsibilities involve all of the crucial aspects of foreign policy: negotiation, engagement, nation-building, monitoring and verification to ensure negotiated agreements are being complied with, etc. (For an excellent discussion of what is necessary, and from a military leader rather than a civilian leader, see The Battle for Peace by General Anthony Zinni. Although Zinni supported Bush/Cheney in 2000 he became very disenchanted with them over their approach to Iraq [Ricks, 2006].)
The Case of the Iraq War
Since pseudo-conservatives “militarize” foreign policy, it becomes more understandable that they placed almost sole emphasis upon planning the military aspects of the Iraq war. Woodward (2004) describes in immense detail how Bush, Rumsfeld, and Franks spent about 15 months planning and re-planning for the military portion of their Iraq invasion. Rumsfeld obsessively went through iteration after iteration of the war plan, honing it, sharpening it, examining all of its assumptions, planning for every contingency—except one, what was the plan for after Saddam was gone? General Zinni, who was Tommy Franks’ predecessor as Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM from 1997-2000, wrote (2006, p. 26), “I had been called before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [on February 11, 2003] to give my views on the coming [Iraq] war. As I waited…I listened to the testimony from… planners from the State and Defense Departments. ‘Planners?’ I thought with horror as I listened to them. ‘The planners have no plan. They’re not thinking about what comes after we’ve invaded Iraq and taken Baghdad.’”
While the Bush II administration had a well worked out plan for making war and toppling Saddam (the easier military portion of the war in Iraq given our immense military superiority), after they took Baghdad and Saddam fled it became clear they had no viable plan to assume power in the political vacuum they had created. They seemed to just stand around and wait for something good to happen. Thomas Ricks, in his careful study of the Iraq war, Fiasco, wrote the following (p. 136):
"During this period [of looting in Baghdad], the U.S. military was perceptibly losing its recent gains; it gave the sense that it really didn’t know what to do next and was waiting to pass the mission to someone else. ‘A finite supply of goodwill toward the Americans evaporated with the passing of each anarchic day,’ Lt. Nathaniel Flick, an elite force recon Marine officer, wrote of being in Baghdad during this time."
"‘There wasn’t any plan,’ recalled a Special Operations officer who was in Baghdad at the time. ‘Everyone was just kind of waiting around. Everybody thought they’d be going home soon.’ Looking back on the period, he recalled it as a slow loss of momentum. ‘It wasn’t like all hell broke loose. It was more like the situation eroded.’"
"Rumsfeld’s fundamental misunderstanding of the looting of Iraq, and the casual manner in which he expressed it [‘Stuff happens’], not only set back U.S. forces tactically, but also damaged the strategic standing of the United States, commented Fred Ikle…. ‘America lost most of its prestige and respect in that episode. To pacify a conquered country, the victor’s prestige and dignity is absolutely crucial.’ This criticism was leveled by a man who not only had impeccable credentials in conservative national security circles, but actually had brought Wolfowitz to Washington…."
The reason for lack of post-war planning was certainly not because responsibility for it was too widely dispersed. Donald Rumsfeld and his Pentagon, strongly supported by Vice President Cheney’s office, had successfully “marginalized” Colin Powell’s State Department and had centralized virtually all war power in its own hands (Woodward, 2004, pp. 79, 149). Even post-war planning was made the Pentagon’s responsibility on January 20, 2003 (Woodward, 2004, p. 283), even though the State Department had been planning for the post-war for some time (David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq, 2005 and Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory, 2005). But a measure of the relative importance of war and post-war can be seen by comparing the dates when each formally began; planning for war began on November 21, 2001 (Woodward, 2004, pp. 1-5), while effective planning for post-war did not begin until two months before the war on January 20, 2003 (Ibid. pp. 280-4). Effective planning for post-war did not start until January 2003 because the Pentagon ignored previous State Department planning (many accounts agree on this but just one is Phillips, 2005, p. 126) and even refused to work with most State Department personnel (Woodward, 2004, pp. 283-4).
Thomas Ricks (2006, p.184-5) tried to explain the failure to plan for post-war in Iraq as due to the Bush II administration’s lack of appreciation for the importance of strategy:
"Strategy was seen as something vague and intellectual, at best a secondary issue, when in fact it was the core of the task they faced. It was the same sort of limited thinking that had led the Bush team first to focus in 2002 and early 2003 almost exclusively on its plan of attack for Iraq, rather than on the more difficult but crucial consolidation of that victory, and that also led it to make wildly unrealistic assumptions about postinvasion Iraq, and then fail to develop operational plans as a fallback if its assumptions proved incorrect."
While Ricks is undoubtedly correct that these leaders failed in strategic thinking, he begs the question of why they failed to think about their ultimate strategic goal: what would they do once Saddam was gone? It’s worthwhile considering the possibility that the reason they failed to do so was because this is precisely the area where they are weakest. Foreign policy to pseudo-conservatives primarily consists of building up the military and using military power. They “don’t do engagement” (James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 280); they commonly condemn “negotiation” as “talking for the sake of talking” or as “appeasement”; they are so suspicious and mistrustful of adversaries that they are often found saying our adversaries won’t “negotiate in good faith” (Kristol, 2006, It’s Our War); they tend to denigrate “nation-building”. Recall that “nation-building” was something Bush pointedly campaigned against in the 2000 debates with Gore. If they in fact reduce foreign policy to the use of military power is it any wonder that the Bush II administration focused “in 2002 and early 2003 almost exclusively on its plan of attack for Iraq”, made “wildly unrealistic assumptions about postinvasion Iraq”, and failed “to develop operational plans as a fallback if its assumptions proved incorrect” (Ricks)? For pseudocons to focus almost entirely upon the military invasion but be unrealistic about complicated post-invasion nation-building is just what we should have expected. Pseudo-conservatives can’t do foreign policy for a similar reason that they can’t govern: they don’t believe in most of the primary tools of foreign policy.
What are the basic “tools” of foreign policy?
There are certainly some basic tools that any country uses to pursue its foreign policy goals. The following is not meant to be an exhaustive list but these are among the obvious tools of foreign policy.
A. Negotiating with opponents, whether one chooses to call this “talking”, “having dialogue”, “engagement”, or any other such term. Through such dialogue we are trying to assess and understand how our opponents see the world, as well as come to agreements, treaties, etc. (“Know thine enemy” is a maxim as important as “Know thyself”.)
B. Making public statements to inform our friends and opponents of our policy. (“Speak softly and carry a big stick” or engage in name-calling and public bluster.)
C. Collecting and analyzing intelligence to be used as the basis of U.S. foreign policy.
D. Providing aid to foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to support activities we see as constructive. “Nation-building” would be included here.
E. Planning and cooperating with international institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, NATO and the International Court of Justice.
F. Monitoring, inspecting and verifying to ensure that others are behaving as they have agreed to behave.
G. Planning and collaborating with allies (and potential allies) for joint cooperative actions.
H. Maintaining embassies and other foreign policy institutions overseas.
I. Cooperation with other countries in legal actions against international lawbreakers such as terrorists.
J. Building up our military power and keeping it effectively modernized; this power can then be used to either threaten military action or to actually use military force.
What do pseudo-conservatives think of such basic instruments of foreign policy? Later posts will address this question.
Wednesday, September 27, 2006
Recognition of the Need for the Term "Pseudo-Conservative"
There have been quite a few indications of the need for a term like "pseudo-conservative". In Robert Reich's recent book, Reason, he chose to call so-called "conservatives" or "neo-conservatives" "Radical Conservatives" or radcons. As I noted below Clinton Rossiter suggested "ultra-conservative". In his book, The Fateful Triangle (1983, South End, p. 13) Noam Chomsky places "conservatives" in quotation marks, suggesting his recognition that these people are not conservative.
These individuals are NOT conservative in any meaningful sense of the term. Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines conservative as " PRESERVATIVE", and "tending or disposed to maintain existing views, conditions, or institutions : TRADITIONAL; marked by moderation or caution; marked by or relating to traditional norms of taste, elegance, style, or manners".
Contemporary so-called "conservatives" for the most part are not preservative or "tending or disposed to maintain existing views, conditions, or institutions." They are certainly not "marked by moderation or caution". Of course, there are some genuine conservatives left in America but most of the well-known individuals using this label today are misusing it. They are radicals of the right or the Radical Right. Certainly William Kristol, Richard Perle, David Frum, Irving Kristol, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, George W. Bush, most people who are at think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute, are not conservatives and should not be labelled so. [One individual at AEI who might qualify as conservative is Norman Ornstein, but at AEI Ornstein sticks out like a sore thumb.] George H. W. Bush has a more authentic claim to being a conservative than does George W.
Terms like radical conservative or ultra-conservative are misnomers because they yield the term "conservative" to individuals who certainly are radical and ultra, but in no way conservative in the majority of their views and positions. They are sham or spurious conservatives, not real conservatives but only pretending to be so. They are pseudo-conservatives.
These individuals are NOT conservative in any meaningful sense of the term. Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines conservative as " PRESERVATIVE", and "tending or disposed to maintain existing views, conditions, or institutions : TRADITIONAL; marked by moderation or caution; marked by or relating to traditional norms of taste, elegance, style, or manners".
Contemporary so-called "conservatives" for the most part are not preservative or "tending or disposed to maintain existing views, conditions, or institutions." They are certainly not "marked by moderation or caution". Of course, there are some genuine conservatives left in America but most of the well-known individuals using this label today are misusing it. They are radicals of the right or the Radical Right. Certainly William Kristol, Richard Perle, David Frum, Irving Kristol, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, George W. Bush, most people who are at think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute, are not conservatives and should not be labelled so. [One individual at AEI who might qualify as conservative is Norman Ornstein, but at AEI Ornstein sticks out like a sore thumb.] George H. W. Bush has a more authentic claim to being a conservative than does George W.
Terms like radical conservative or ultra-conservative are misnomers because they yield the term "conservative" to individuals who certainly are radical and ultra, but in no way conservative in the majority of their views and positions. They are sham or spurious conservatives, not real conservatives but only pretending to be so. They are pseudo-conservatives.
Monday, September 11, 2006
Some Omissions in the First Post
I have cited books but have not always given titles, publishers, etc. If anyone would like the full citations just ask.
Why Pseudo-Conservatives are not "Conservative"
I'm working on a book concerning "Why 'Conservatives' Can't Do Foreign Policy". I'm going to post pieces of it here in the hope of getting useful feedback from folks on the Web. In this first post I'm including an introduction to some basic ideas. First, I have to explain why I believe so-called "conservatives" and "neo-conservatives" are NOT conservative; or, why I have Conservatives in quotation marks. Here's a draft explaining the latter issue.
Why Pseudo-Conservatives are not "Conservative"
Reading contemporary American commentary one hears again and again various members of the American right-wing referred to as “conservative” or as “neo-conservative”. I believe this is one of the most fundamental misnomers in the rhetoric of contemporary politics; it represents a very creative and thus far successful attempt to make individuals who advocate views that are radical and extremist sound like they are really simply wholesome proponents of preserving what is good in American society.
What is conservatism?
In his prize-winning book, Conservatism in America, Clinton Rossiter wrote (1962, p. 26): “At the center of the constellation of virtues which make up the good… Conservative… is prudence. ‘Prudence,’ Burke wrote, ‘is not only first in rank of the virtues political and moral, but she is the director’ of all the others…. [T]here is no doubt that [prudence] represents a cluster of urges—toward caution, deliberation, and discretion, toward moderation and calculation, toward old ways and good form….”
It is well to remember that Edmund Burke was the father of conservatism and thus an essential source for Rossiter. Burke’s emphasis was upon “old ways” because he believed that our current society has developed slowly and organically, keeping only those traditions and institutions which have served well and thus stood the test of time. Rossiter (p. 48) later continued, “Nothing is more foreign to the Conservative cast of mind than lawless violence. The Conservative’s whole nature revolts against the cruelty, unpredictability, and inadequacy of brute force as a solution to problems of human relations. He does not seek peace at all costs, but he seeks it with all his powers.”
Rossiter believed Dwight Eisenhower was a modern American representative of conservatism and I agree he is an excellent example in many ways. But let us not forget that the Radical Right of the 1950s, e.g., rabid anti-communists like Robert Welch of the John Birch Society and, to some degree, Sen. Joseph McCarthy, believed that President Eisenhower seemed to be carrying out the dictates of the “international communist conspiracy”. Rossiter (pp. 168-9) called these people “ultra-conservatives” and listed Barry Goldwater and William F. Buckley, Jr. as examples. Rossiter referred to Senator McCarthy as “their defunct and tarnished Galahad”.
What is Pseudo-Conservatism?
Although I heartily recommend Rossiter’s book I disagree that “ultra-conservatism” is a useful label. However, Rossiter (p. 168) does recognize and quote agreeably the term I believe most accurate, “pseudo-conservatism”. Indeed, if one looks in Rossiter’s index under “pseudo-conservatism” one is told to “See also Ultra-conservatism”. Given Rossiter’s very careful attempt to define the essence of “conservatism,” choosing any term suggesting that those he refers to as “the choleric Right” bear any resemblance to true conservatives debases his effort. They have wrongly appropriated the label for themselves and as such should be referred to as “pseudo-conservatives”.
Apparently, one of the first uses of “pseudo-conservative” appeared in The Authoritarian Personality, a popular book, which was widely read in the 1950s. (This work has been improved and brought up to date by Robert Altemeyer [Enemies of Freedom, 1988] and used extensively in John Dean’s Conservatives Without Conscience, 2006.) The term was elaborated by historian Richard Hofstadter in two essays published in 1955 and 1962. (These essays can be found in The Radical Right, edited by Daniel Bell, 1963.) Hofstadter (1955, p. 77) quoted what The Authoritarian Personality had to say: “The pseudo-conservative is a man who, in the name of upholding traditional American values and institutions..., consciously or unconsciously aims at their abolition.”
Hofstadter went on to elaborate the concept (1955, pp. 76-7): “[T]he new dissent [of the radical right]not only has no respect for non-conformism, but is based upon a relentless demand for conformity. It can most accurately be called pseudo-conservative… because its exponents, although they believe themselves to be conservatives and usually employ the rhetoric of conservatism, show signs of a serious and restless dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions. They have little in common with the temperate and compromising spirit of true conservatism….”
Returning to the subject in a follow-up essay, “Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited” (1962), Hofstadter continued (pp 102-3): “The right wing tolerates no compromises, accepts no half measures, understands no defeats. In this respect, it stands psychologically outside the frame of normal democratic politics, which is largely an affair of compromise. One of the most fundamental qualities, then, in the right wing mentality of our time is its implicit utopianism. I can think of no more economical way of expressing its fundamental difference from the spirit of genuine conservatism…. [T]here is one force in American life, hardly more than hinted at in my original formulation, that would now loom very large indeed, and that is fundamentalism…. To understand the Manichaean style of thought, the apocalyptic tendencies, the love of mystification, the intolerance of compromise that are observable in the right-wing mind, we need to understand the history of fundamentalism….”
Hofstadter was right to emphasize that pseudo-conservatives “show signs of a serious and restless dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions. They have little in common with the temperate and compromising spirit of true conservatism….” This is true of contemporary pseudo-conservatives like Richard Perle, William Kristol and many others. These are individuals who radically disagree with much of American foreign policy and wish to tear it down and replace it with their radical vision of “tough”, “hard-line”, hyper-military policy. (Pseudo-conservatives are equally radical regarding domestic policy as they wish to repeal the estate tax and weaken, if not eliminate, many achievements of the New Deal. George W. Bush’s proposed “reform” of Social Security bears some similarity to, the Clark amendment, a provision Republicans and pseudo-conservative Democrats wanted included in the original law. FDR, realizing it was an attempt to destroy Social Security, held firm and eventually prevailed [Hacker, 2002, p. 101].)
It is also interesting to note that Hofstadter recognized the kinship of “fundamentalism” to the views of the radical right; he must be considered very prescient as we now see that much of the radical right in the Republican party is claiming fundamentalism as well. Many on the Christian right also back a hyper-aggressive, militarized foreign policy. (It is certainly questionable whether the “Christian” right merits the label “Christian”. This calls to mind Ghandi’s comment: “I like your Christ. I do not like your Christians. Your Christians are so unlike your Christ.”)
For example, President George W. Bush is referred to as conservative on a daily basis. Yet he is the author of a policy of “preemptive” war which is virtually universally acknowledged to be a radical departure from previous U.S. foreign policy. (In reality, as Stephen Walt (2005, pp. 59, 261) has pointed out, Bush’s policy is more accurately one of “preventive war”; one “preempts” when an enemy is about to attack; preventive war aims “to prevent an enemy from becoming stronger… even if there is no sign of an imminent attack.”) Whether or not one agrees with Bush is not the issue, whatever one thinks of the Bush Doctrine it is not a “conservative” policy.
One hears individuals like Richard Perle and William Kristol referred to regularly as “neo-conservatives”, yet Perle was one of the most aggressive proponents of a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein and one of the most withering critics of attempts to maintain “stability” and continue to slowly pursue the continued “containment” of Saddam (see Perle, 2000, pp. 99-102). Attempting to maintain stability and continuing to contain Saddam would have been truly conservative policies. Advocating his military overthrow using U.S. troops was a radical departure from past policy which entailed great risks, as can be seen by what has happened since we invaded.
Not yet convinced that Perle is a radical? Here is his suggested policy for dealing with North Korea (Frum and Perle, 2004, p. 87): “Decisive action would begin with a comprehensive air and naval blockade of North Korea, cutting it off from all seaborne traffic, all international aviation, and all intercourse with the South. South Korea will object, but it needs to be made to understand that… a blockade is its best alternative to war…. Next, we must accelerate the redeployment of our ground troops on the Korean peninsula so they are beyond the range of North Korean artillery and short-range rockets…. But we hope—and this hope is, we think, well founded—that a credible buildup… will persuade the Chinese finally to… bring the North Koreans to heel.” Risking the possibility that North Korea would use the many military facilities it already has in place to shell Seoul, while also risking the possibility of a war with China, is the very antithesis of the term “conservative”. Recall that Seoul is one of the smallest and most densely populated major cities (Greater Seoul area population 23 million) and is only 30 miles from the demilitarized border with North Korea. The South Koreans may perhaps be forgiven their trepidation about a military confrontation engineered by Richard Perle, who would be able to witness all this from his second home in the south of France. (France? The home of “freedom fries”? Yes, that’s right. See Packer, 2005, p. 28: “For all of his French-baiting, Perle has a house in southern France and a living room in Chevy Chase full of French cookbooks.”)
How about well-known “neo-conservative” William Kristol? During the 2006 Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Hezbollah Mr. Kristol made an eminently “conservative” suggestion (Weekly Standard July 24, 2006). This war allegedly began when Hezbollah attacked Israeli soldiers just inside Israel and captured two alive. (I say “allegedly” for a reason. Seymour Hersh (The New Yorker, August 21, 2006 wrote: “The Pentagon consultant [Hersh’s source] noted that there had also been cross-border incidents involving Israel and Hezbollah, in both directions, for some time. “They’ve been sniping at each other,” he said. “Either side could have pointed to some incident and said ‘We have to go to war with these guys’….” Hersh’s sources claimed the Israelis had their bombing campaign in Lebanon planned months earlier, had shared the plans with the Bush administration and gained the administration’s support. The administration denied these claims but Hersh added: “The White House did not respond to a detailed list of questions.”)
Claiming that Hezbollah, a group supported by Iran but with its own extensive political and social base among the 40% Shia population in Lebanon, is identical with Iran, Kristol suggested that either the United States or Israel “consider countering this act of Iranian (sic) aggression with a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Why wait? Does anyone think a nuclear Iran can be contained? ... Yes, there would be repercussions—and they would be healthy ones, showing a strong America that has rejected further appeasement.” This “modest proposal” ignores the fact that Iran is not a direct combatant in the conflict, ignores the clear distinction between a Hezbollah with Iranian support and Iran itself, and dismisses any worries about untoward “repercussions”. It implicitly suggests that, although the U.S. was successful in containing a nuclear Soviet Union for 40 years, it’s inconceivable we could also do so with a not yet nuclear Iran. Again, whether one agrees with Kristol or not, his proposal is thoroughly radical and bears no recognizable resemblance to any meaningful concept of conservatism. These examples could be multiplied filling many volumes.
OK, that's a partial intro to what conservative actually means and why pseudo-conservatives are NOT conservative. This draft will be further filled out in the future with more about what the label "conservative" really means.
Why Pseudo-Conservatives are not "Conservative"
Reading contemporary American commentary one hears again and again various members of the American right-wing referred to as “conservative” or as “neo-conservative”. I believe this is one of the most fundamental misnomers in the rhetoric of contemporary politics; it represents a very creative and thus far successful attempt to make individuals who advocate views that are radical and extremist sound like they are really simply wholesome proponents of preserving what is good in American society.
What is conservatism?
In his prize-winning book, Conservatism in America, Clinton Rossiter wrote (1962, p. 26): “At the center of the constellation of virtues which make up the good… Conservative… is prudence. ‘Prudence,’ Burke wrote, ‘is not only first in rank of the virtues political and moral, but she is the director’ of all the others…. [T]here is no doubt that [prudence] represents a cluster of urges—toward caution, deliberation, and discretion, toward moderation and calculation, toward old ways and good form….”
It is well to remember that Edmund Burke was the father of conservatism and thus an essential source for Rossiter. Burke’s emphasis was upon “old ways” because he believed that our current society has developed slowly and organically, keeping only those traditions and institutions which have served well and thus stood the test of time. Rossiter (p. 48) later continued, “Nothing is more foreign to the Conservative cast of mind than lawless violence. The Conservative’s whole nature revolts against the cruelty, unpredictability, and inadequacy of brute force as a solution to problems of human relations. He does not seek peace at all costs, but he seeks it with all his powers.”
Rossiter believed Dwight Eisenhower was a modern American representative of conservatism and I agree he is an excellent example in many ways. But let us not forget that the Radical Right of the 1950s, e.g., rabid anti-communists like Robert Welch of the John Birch Society and, to some degree, Sen. Joseph McCarthy, believed that President Eisenhower seemed to be carrying out the dictates of the “international communist conspiracy”. Rossiter (pp. 168-9) called these people “ultra-conservatives” and listed Barry Goldwater and William F. Buckley, Jr. as examples. Rossiter referred to Senator McCarthy as “their defunct and tarnished Galahad”.
What is Pseudo-Conservatism?
Although I heartily recommend Rossiter’s book I disagree that “ultra-conservatism” is a useful label. However, Rossiter (p. 168) does recognize and quote agreeably the term I believe most accurate, “pseudo-conservatism”. Indeed, if one looks in Rossiter’s index under “pseudo-conservatism” one is told to “See also Ultra-conservatism”. Given Rossiter’s very careful attempt to define the essence of “conservatism,” choosing any term suggesting that those he refers to as “the choleric Right” bear any resemblance to true conservatives debases his effort. They have wrongly appropriated the label for themselves and as such should be referred to as “pseudo-conservatives”.
Apparently, one of the first uses of “pseudo-conservative” appeared in The Authoritarian Personality, a popular book, which was widely read in the 1950s. (This work has been improved and brought up to date by Robert Altemeyer [Enemies of Freedom, 1988] and used extensively in John Dean’s Conservatives Without Conscience, 2006.) The term was elaborated by historian Richard Hofstadter in two essays published in 1955 and 1962. (These essays can be found in The Radical Right, edited by Daniel Bell, 1963.) Hofstadter (1955, p. 77) quoted what The Authoritarian Personality had to say: “The pseudo-conservative is a man who, in the name of upholding traditional American values and institutions..., consciously or unconsciously aims at their abolition.”
Hofstadter went on to elaborate the concept (1955, pp. 76-7): “[T]he new dissent [of the radical right]not only has no respect for non-conformism, but is based upon a relentless demand for conformity. It can most accurately be called pseudo-conservative… because its exponents, although they believe themselves to be conservatives and usually employ the rhetoric of conservatism, show signs of a serious and restless dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions. They have little in common with the temperate and compromising spirit of true conservatism….”
Returning to the subject in a follow-up essay, “Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited” (1962), Hofstadter continued (pp 102-3): “The right wing tolerates no compromises, accepts no half measures, understands no defeats. In this respect, it stands psychologically outside the frame of normal democratic politics, which is largely an affair of compromise. One of the most fundamental qualities, then, in the right wing mentality of our time is its implicit utopianism. I can think of no more economical way of expressing its fundamental difference from the spirit of genuine conservatism…. [T]here is one force in American life, hardly more than hinted at in my original formulation, that would now loom very large indeed, and that is fundamentalism…. To understand the Manichaean style of thought, the apocalyptic tendencies, the love of mystification, the intolerance of compromise that are observable in the right-wing mind, we need to understand the history of fundamentalism….”
Hofstadter was right to emphasize that pseudo-conservatives “show signs of a serious and restless dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions. They have little in common with the temperate and compromising spirit of true conservatism….” This is true of contemporary pseudo-conservatives like Richard Perle, William Kristol and many others. These are individuals who radically disagree with much of American foreign policy and wish to tear it down and replace it with their radical vision of “tough”, “hard-line”, hyper-military policy. (Pseudo-conservatives are equally radical regarding domestic policy as they wish to repeal the estate tax and weaken, if not eliminate, many achievements of the New Deal. George W. Bush’s proposed “reform” of Social Security bears some similarity to, the Clark amendment, a provision Republicans and pseudo-conservative Democrats wanted included in the original law. FDR, realizing it was an attempt to destroy Social Security, held firm and eventually prevailed [Hacker, 2002, p. 101].)
It is also interesting to note that Hofstadter recognized the kinship of “fundamentalism” to the views of the radical right; he must be considered very prescient as we now see that much of the radical right in the Republican party is claiming fundamentalism as well. Many on the Christian right also back a hyper-aggressive, militarized foreign policy. (It is certainly questionable whether the “Christian” right merits the label “Christian”. This calls to mind Ghandi’s comment: “I like your Christ. I do not like your Christians. Your Christians are so unlike your Christ.”)
For example, President George W. Bush is referred to as conservative on a daily basis. Yet he is the author of a policy of “preemptive” war which is virtually universally acknowledged to be a radical departure from previous U.S. foreign policy. (In reality, as Stephen Walt (2005, pp. 59, 261) has pointed out, Bush’s policy is more accurately one of “preventive war”; one “preempts” when an enemy is about to attack; preventive war aims “to prevent an enemy from becoming stronger… even if there is no sign of an imminent attack.”) Whether or not one agrees with Bush is not the issue, whatever one thinks of the Bush Doctrine it is not a “conservative” policy.
One hears individuals like Richard Perle and William Kristol referred to regularly as “neo-conservatives”, yet Perle was one of the most aggressive proponents of a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein and one of the most withering critics of attempts to maintain “stability” and continue to slowly pursue the continued “containment” of Saddam (see Perle, 2000, pp. 99-102). Attempting to maintain stability and continuing to contain Saddam would have been truly conservative policies. Advocating his military overthrow using U.S. troops was a radical departure from past policy which entailed great risks, as can be seen by what has happened since we invaded.
Not yet convinced that Perle is a radical? Here is his suggested policy for dealing with North Korea (Frum and Perle, 2004, p. 87): “Decisive action would begin with a comprehensive air and naval blockade of North Korea, cutting it off from all seaborne traffic, all international aviation, and all intercourse with the South. South Korea will object, but it needs to be made to understand that… a blockade is its best alternative to war…. Next, we must accelerate the redeployment of our ground troops on the Korean peninsula so they are beyond the range of North Korean artillery and short-range rockets…. But we hope—and this hope is, we think, well founded—that a credible buildup… will persuade the Chinese finally to… bring the North Koreans to heel.” Risking the possibility that North Korea would use the many military facilities it already has in place to shell Seoul, while also risking the possibility of a war with China, is the very antithesis of the term “conservative”. Recall that Seoul is one of the smallest and most densely populated major cities (Greater Seoul area population 23 million) and is only 30 miles from the demilitarized border with North Korea. The South Koreans may perhaps be forgiven their trepidation about a military confrontation engineered by Richard Perle, who would be able to witness all this from his second home in the south of France. (France? The home of “freedom fries”? Yes, that’s right. See Packer, 2005, p. 28: “For all of his French-baiting, Perle has a house in southern France and a living room in Chevy Chase full of French cookbooks.”)
How about well-known “neo-conservative” William Kristol? During the 2006 Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Hezbollah Mr. Kristol made an eminently “conservative” suggestion (Weekly Standard July 24, 2006). This war allegedly began when Hezbollah attacked Israeli soldiers just inside Israel and captured two alive. (I say “allegedly” for a reason. Seymour Hersh (The New Yorker, August 21, 2006 wrote: “The Pentagon consultant [Hersh’s source] noted that there had also been cross-border incidents involving Israel and Hezbollah, in both directions, for some time. “They’ve been sniping at each other,” he said. “Either side could have pointed to some incident and said ‘We have to go to war with these guys’….” Hersh’s sources claimed the Israelis had their bombing campaign in Lebanon planned months earlier, had shared the plans with the Bush administration and gained the administration’s support. The administration denied these claims but Hersh added: “The White House did not respond to a detailed list of questions.”)
Claiming that Hezbollah, a group supported by Iran but with its own extensive political and social base among the 40% Shia population in Lebanon, is identical with Iran, Kristol suggested that either the United States or Israel “consider countering this act of Iranian (sic) aggression with a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Why wait? Does anyone think a nuclear Iran can be contained? ... Yes, there would be repercussions—and they would be healthy ones, showing a strong America that has rejected further appeasement.” This “modest proposal” ignores the fact that Iran is not a direct combatant in the conflict, ignores the clear distinction between a Hezbollah with Iranian support and Iran itself, and dismisses any worries about untoward “repercussions”. It implicitly suggests that, although the U.S. was successful in containing a nuclear Soviet Union for 40 years, it’s inconceivable we could also do so with a not yet nuclear Iran. Again, whether one agrees with Kristol or not, his proposal is thoroughly radical and bears no recognizable resemblance to any meaningful concept of conservatism. These examples could be multiplied filling many volumes.
OK, that's a partial intro to what conservative actually means and why pseudo-conservatives are NOT conservative. This draft will be further filled out in the future with more about what the label "conservative" really means.
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